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ABSTRACT
This Article empirically evaluates the proceduralprotections given to police officers facing disciplinary interrogations about alleged misconduct. It
demonstrates that state laws and collective bargainingagreements have insulated many police officers from the most successful interrogationtechniques.
The first part of this Article builds on previous studies by analyzing a
dataset of police union contracts and state laws that govern the working conditions in a substantial cross section of large and midsized American police departments. Many of these police departments provide officers with hours or
even days of advanced notice before a disciplinary interrogation. An even
largerpercentage of these police departments require internal investigators to
provide officers with copies of incriminating evidence before any interrogation. These protections exist in departments of all sizes, regardless of geographical location.
The second part of this Article relies on a national survey of American
law enforcement leaders to evaluate whether these regulationsfrustrate officer
accountability efforts. The overwhelming majority of the survey respondents
claimed that these interrogationregulationssubstantially burden legitimate investigations into officer behavior. Virtually all survey respondents agreed that
these protections do little to reduce the likelihood of false confessions.
Combined, this data paints a troublingpicture of the internalprocedures
used to investigate and respond to officer misconduct. This data suggests that
states and municipalities have given police officers proceduralprotections designed to thwart internal investigations, thereby limiting officer accountability.
This Article concludes by offering normative recommendations on how communities can reform interrogationsof police officers so as to balance the community interest in accountability with officers' interests in due process.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 12, 2015, Baltimore police arrested a 25-year-old man
named Freddie Gray for allegedly possessing an illegal knife.' Police
and eye witnesses disagreed on the circumstances leading up to Mr.
Gray's arrest. The charging document filed by local law enforcement
claimed that Mr. Gray "fled unprovoked upon noticing police presence," resulting in a brief pursuit and "arrest[] without force or incident."' 2 But according to other witnesses at the scene, the arrest was
1 Investigators later determined that Mr. Gray's knife was, in fact, legal under local law.
Joshua Barajas, Freddie Gray's Death Ruled a Homicide, PBS NEws HOUR (May 1, 2015, 11:13
AM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/freddie-grays-death-ruled-homicide
[https://
perma.cc/25HP-RDA5].
2 Eyder Peralta, Timeline: What We Know About the Freddie Gray Arrest, NPR (May 1,
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anything but ordinary. As one eye witness recounted, officers restrained Mr. Gray by bending his legs backward, causing him to
"scream[] for his life."' 3 Video from the scene at least partially corroborates the eye witness account, as it shows Mr. Gray screaming in
pain as officers took him into custody. 4 At the time that officers put
Mr. Gray into the back of a police transport van, officers claimed he
was "talking and breathing, '5 even though one eye witness said Mr.
6
Gray's legs appeared broken.
Despite the seemingly inconsistent accounts of Mr. Gray's arrest,
all parties agree that police officers placed Mr. Gray in the back of a
police transport van around 8:42 AM. 7 About 45 minutes later, Mr.
Gray arrived at a local police station unconscious and in "serious medical distress." 8 At some point, Mr. Gray suffered a severe spinal cord
injury and a crushed voice box caused by "forceful trauma." 9 Mr.
Gray fell into a coma before dying a week later. 10
In the days that followed, Baltimore officials placed all six officers involved in Mr. Gray's death on paid leave pending the completion of an internal investigation. 1 Early on, there were more questions
than answers. Were the officer statements contained in the charging
document truthful? Did officers use any force in arresting Mr. Gray?
And what happened in the back of the transport vehicle that could
have fatally injured Mr. Gray?
2015, 8:23 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/05/01/403629104/baltimore-protests-what-we-know-about-the-freddie-gray-arrest [https://perma.cc/SC7J-L4U5].
3 Kevin Rector, The 45-minute Mystery of Freddie Gray's Death, BALT. SUN (Apr. 25,
2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/freddie-gray/bs-md-gray-ticker20150425-story.html [https://perma.cc/D55P-HTY7] (describing the account of an eye witness).
4 CNN, New Video Shows Arrest of Freddie Gray in Baltimore, YouTUBE (Apr. 21,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7YVOEtkWyno [https://perma.ccT3HW-DPJ3].
5 Doug Donovan & Mark Puente, Freddie Gray Not the First to Come out of Baltimore
Police Van with Serious Injuries, BALT. SUN (Apr. 23, 2015, 7:47 PM), http://
www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-cityfbs-md-gray-rough-rides-20150423story.html [https://perma.cc/D9P2-QA2T].
6 Rector, supra note 3.

Id.
8 Id.
7

9 Scott Dance, Freddie Gray's Spinal Injury Suggests 'Forceful Trauma,' Doctors Say,
(Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.baltimoresun.com/healthlbs-hs-gray-injuries-20150420story.html [https://perma.cc/MJR3-VYVH].
10 Rector, supra note 3.
BALT. SUN

11 Justin Fenton & Justin George, Five Officers in Freddie Gray Case Gave Accounts of
Incident, BALT. SUN (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:30 AM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/
[https://perma.cc/2PQCcrime/bs-md-freddie-gray-mayor-comments-20150422-story.html
XXBG].
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Unraveling these questions in the absence of significant physical

evidence proved challenging for investigators. Were these civilians
rather than police officers involved in Mr. Gray's death, there is little
doubt what would happen next: investigators would begin interrogating those involved in Mr. Gray's death. As one of the nation's leading
interrogation manuals explains, in cases where "physical clues are en-

tirely absent," the "only" method for uncovering the truth is the "interrogation of the criminal suspect himself, as well as of others who

may possess significant information. '12 These interrogations com13
monly involve "psychological tactics" including the use of deception.
As a number of legal scholars have observed, the law gives police officers wide discretion in the kinds of interrogation tactics they can use
14
against civilians.
But these were police officers, not civilians, involved in Mr.
Gray's death. Any investigator in Maryland attempting to interrogate
a police officer suspected of professional misconduct faces significant
procedural hurdles. 15 Under Maryland's Law Enforcement Officer

Bill of Rights, internal investigators must give officers 10 days of notice before conducting an interrogation. 16 If investigators fail to abide
by this 10-day waiting period, any statement made by the officer dur-

ing an interrogation may be inadmissible in future disciplinary or termination proceedings. 17 Supporters of the Maryland law claim that it
gives officers valuable time to rest before an interrogation, thereby

improving the ability of officers to recall events accurately.'i But critics argue that the Maryland waiting period hampers internal investiga12

FRED

E.

INBAU, JOHN

E.

REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY

INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS Xi
13

&

BRIAN

C.

JAYNE, CRIMINAL

(5th ed. 2013).

Id.

14 See infra Sections I.A-.B.
15

See MD. CODE ANN., PuB. SAFETY § 3-104 (LexisNexis 2011).

16 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(j)(2)(i)-(ii), (n) (LexisNexis 2011). Additionally,

it is important to clarify that to the extent investigators believe an officer may have committed a
crime, that officer is entitled to all constitutionally required protections. That is, the officer as a
criminal suspect undergoing a custodial interrogation has a right to remain silent, the right to an
attorney, and the right to end an interrogation. This Article deals specifically with disciplinary
interrogations-those used by internal investigators to decide whether an officer should face
disciplinary sanctions, including suspension or termination, for a violation of departmental
policies.
17

See MND.CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-104(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (stating that any time a

police department is investigating an officer for misconduct and the investigation may lead to
punitive action, these protections shall apply).
18 Examining Police Practicesand Use of Force:Briefing Before the U.S. Comm'n on Civil
Rights 52-53 (2015), https://www.usccr.gov/calendar/trnscrpt/Police-Practices-and-Use-ofForce_04-20-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KU7D-MK7Y] (testimony of Sean Smoot, Police Benevolent & Protective Association of Illinois) (arguing that "the research shows and the science
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tions by allowing police officers to coordinate stories in a manner that
deflects blame. 19
Baltimore is far from the only city to provide officers with these
kinds of protections during internal investigations. Civil rights advocates have criticized similar provisions across the country that grant
police officers substantially more protections than civilians when undergoing interrogations. 20 Many of these provisions go even further
than the Maryland law. As various media outlets have observed, some
state laws or collective bargaining agreements also provide officers
with access to incriminating evidence before an interrogation, 21 regulate the length of officer interrogations, 22 restrict the number of investigators that can be present during an interrogation,23 and strictly limit
24
the ways that investigators can question officers.
shows that [officers] can get... tunnel vision" during stressful situations, and a delay of 48 hours
or more helps officers better remember the incident as memories "come back to them").
19 Samuel Walker, Police Union Contract "Waiting Periods" for Misconduct Investigations
Not Supported by Scientific Evidence (July 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (http://
samuelwalker.net/wp-contentuploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QF9RRYEJ]) (providing a detailed critique of these kinds of claims by Smoot and others). Additionally, according to Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, this state law makes it difficult
for investigators in Baltimore to "fully engage" with officers accused of misconduct. Liz Fields,
Police Officer 'Bill of Rights' Blamed for Baltimore's Information Blackout in Case of Freddie
Gray's Severed Spine, VICE NEWS (April 22, 2015), https://news.vice.com/article/police-officerbill-of-rights-blamed-for-baltimores-information-blackout-in-case-of-freddie-grays-severedspine [https://perma.cc/8HYW-ST6Q].
20 See, e.g., Eli Hager, Blue Shield, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 27, 2015, 12:06 PM), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/27/blue-shield
[https://perma.cc/E3Z9-85UR] (critiquing
law enforcement officer bills of rights as giving police officers "special treatment" during
investigations).
21 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 112.532(1)(d) (2018) (providing officers in Florida with access to
virtually all evidence against them before an interrogation).
22 See, e.g., Crrv OF MUNCIE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN FOP LODGE #87 AND THE CITY OF
MUNCIE § 41.01(D) (2009), http://www.cityofmuncie.com/upload/assets/dbDocuments/fop.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M4WF-TV6T] (providing a two-hour limit on the length of interrogations of
police officers).
23 See, e.g., CITv OF LAS CRUCES, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF LAS CRUCES AND
POLICE, LAS CRUCES POLICE OFFICER'S ASSOCIATION § 32(D)(4) (2013)
(on file with author) (limiting the number of interrogators to two).
FRATERNAL ORDER OF

24

See, e.g., CITY OF OVIEDO, COLLEcTrvE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY

OF OVIEDO AND THE COASTAL FLORIDA POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., CERTIFICA

1465

-

NUMBER 1653, Art. 7 § 2(F)-(H) (2018), http://
sire.cityofoviedo.net/sirepub/agdocs.aspx?doctype=minutes&itemid=12451
[https://perma.cc/
2DWF-HN8M] (follow "Exhibit 1" hyperlink) (preventing interrogators from using abusive, offensive, or threatening language, barring promises, rewards, or threats, requiring the recording
of interrogations, and limiting the asking of questions that have been previously answered by the
officer in a prior statement).

TION

NUMBER

AND

CERTIFICATION
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While legal scholars have extensively examined how the law regulates the interrogation of criminal suspects,2 5 a far smaller body of
literature has considered interrogations of police officers suspected of
professional misconduct. This Article conducts a comprehensive evaluation of the procedural protections afforded to police officers facing
disciplinary interrogations across a large cross section of American
police departments.
The first Part of this Article analyzes a dataset of 657 police union
contracts and 20 law enforcement officer bills of rights ("LEOBRs")
that govern the internal disciplinary procedures of a substantial portion of police officers in the United States. While many of these jurisdictions have reasonable regulations in place to prevent coercive or
abusive tactics, a significant number of departments provide officers
with interrogation protections that may frustrate accountability efforts. Around 21% of agencies in our dataset delay disciplinary interrogations of police officers after possible misconduct. 26 The typical
contract affords officers around 48 hours of notice before they must
undergo interrogations about suspected misconduct. 27 Approximately
28% of agencies in our dataset require internal investigators to turn
over potentially incriminating evidence to officers before questioning
may begin, including copies of civilian complaints, the name of com28
plainants, video evidence, audio evidence, and GPS locational data.
These protections exist in a substantial number of police departments
across the country regardless of department size, location, or demo29
graphic characteristics.
The second Part of this Article considers whether these kinds of
restrictions on officer interrogations impair the ability of internal investigators to hold officers accountable for misconduct.30 To do this,
we conducted a national survey of American law enforcement leaders.
We sent 550 surveys to municipal law enforcement leaders across 48
states. The survey instrument asked officers whether they believed
that these kinds of protections-specifically, waiting periods and prior
access to incriminating evidence before an interrogation-may "burden an investigation," or otherwise "limit the ability of interrogators
25

See infra Section I.A.

26

See infra Part IV-Section IV.A.

Infra Section IV.A. Section IV.A directly states that the median jurisdiction delays interrogations for around 48 hours.
28 See infra Part IV.
27

29

See infra Section III.B; see also infra Part IV.

30

See infra Part II.
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to uncover the truth" during an interrogation. 31 Additionally, we
asked whether police leaders believed that these kinds of protections
may be useful in reducing the possibility of false confessions, and we
32
provided an opportunity for officers to give written feedback.
Each survey question merely asked respondents about a hypothetical limitation on the ability of an "interrogator" to interrogate a
"suspect. ' 33 Predictably, as demonstrated by their written replies,
many of the survey respondents envisioned these limits applying to
civilian interrogations, rather than interrogations of police officers
suspected of misconduct. 34 Responses were almost uniformly consistent. Nearly all of the 156 survey respondents claimed that waiting
periods and prior access to incriminating evidence would limit the effectiveness of any interrogation. 35 More than 97% of survey respondents claimed that these provisions would either "occasionally" or
"frequently" burden investigations. 36 Additionally, the overwhelming
majority of survey respondents claimed that these kinds of protections
were unnecessary to protect against false confessions. 37 Further, a
large number of officers expressed outrage in supplemental written
feedback, with many suggesting that these limitations would severely
38
hamper the effectiveness of interrogations.
Combined, this data paints a troubling picture of the internal procedures used to investigate and respond to officer misconduct. These
data strongly suggest that many police officers across the country have
successfully obtained protections against coercive interrogation techniques during internal investigations that most officers would view as
unacceptably burdensome if applied to civilian interrogations. This
finding has important implications for the study of police accountability and criminal procedure. It suggests that labor and employment
31
32

Infra Appendix B.
Infra Appendix B.

For the complete survey instrument, see infra Appendix B.
Perhaps no survey response better illustrates this than one respondent who provided the
following qualitative feedback: "Why are 'advocates' constantly protecting criminals and hindering justice for victims[?]" Survey Response from Police Chief #56 (July 18, 2018) (on file with
author).
35 See infra Section IV.C.
36 Infra Section IV.C (showing that around 142 of the respondents found that a delay
period would occasionally or frequently burden investigations, while around 140 of the respondents felt that prior access to evidence would similarly burden investigations).
37 See Survey Response from Police Chief #1-156 (on file with author) (showing that 151
of the 156 respondents who answered this question claimed that these protections are not necessary to protect those facing interrogations).
38 See infra Section IV.C.
33

34
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protections have effectively insulated many officers from accountability. This Article concludes by offering normative recommendations on
how communities can reform interrogations of police officers to balance the community interest in accountability with officers' interests
in due process during internal investigations.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I situates this paper's contribution within the growing literature on the internal disciplinary procedures in American police departments. Part II discusses the existing
literature on the interrogation of police officers. Part III breaks down
the methodology used in this Article. Part IV presents the results of
our study, and Part V offers some normative recommendations for
reforming interrogations of police officers.

I.

INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS AND POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

Internal investigations are critically important in holding police
officers accountable for misconduct. In order to determine whether a
police officer's behavior has violated the law, the Constitution, or internal departmental policies, police departments must generally conduct an internal investigation. This is because, as prior scholars have
observed, police officers often investigate their fellow officers in cases
of alleged misconduct or criminal acts. 39 Internal departmental investigations determine whether an officer will face disciplinary penalties,
including suspension or termination. 40 These internal investigations
can also determine whether an officer will be subject to criminal prosecution.41 Thus, any examination of police accountability must consider the process by which police departments investigate their own
officers.
While internal investigators increasingly rely on body-worn camera footage, 42 dash camera footage, 43 and civilian cell phone videos, 44
39 See Sean F. Kelly, Internal Affairs: Issues for Small Police Departments, FBI L. ENBULL., July 2003, at 1 (describing how police departments, specifically smaller agencies, handle the responsibilities of investigating officers suspected of misconduct).
40 See generally Kate Levine, Discipline and Policing, 68 DUKE L.J. 839 (2019) (providing
a detailed accounting of the operation of internal investigations and discipline, examining the
kinds of punishments that officers can receive for various infractions, and problematizing the
traditional narrative surrounding police discipline).
41 See John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 Wis. L. REv. 789, 804 (citing a
California law that generally provides that "investigations of police misconduct are [to be] conducted by the Internal Affairs Division of the suspect officer's own department").
42 See Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras, 96 N.C. L. Rav. 1363, 1371-78
(2018) (discussing the development of police videos, including in-car and body-worn cameras).
FORCEmENT

43

See id.
44 See generally Jocelyn Simonson, Copwatching, 104 CAL. L. Rav. 391, 408, 414 (2016)
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investigators also must often interrogate police officers in order to uncover the truth. Interrogations of civilians in criminal cases are a common and thoroughly researched phenomenon. Social scientists have
found that investigators frequently employ sophisticated and psycho-

logically coercive tactics 45 to elicit incriminating statements from civilians during custodial interrogations. 46 Investigators have been able to

accomplish this in the context of civilian interrogations, in part, because courts and legislators grant investigators wide latitude to use

any interrogation tactics that do not undermine the voluntariness of a
statement made by a criminal suspect. By contrast, a complex web of
labor and employment regulations prevent internal investigators from
using many of these same tactics against police officers suspected of
misconduct or unlawful behavior.
This Part evaluates the constitutional and legal regulation of po-

lice and civilian interrogations. Section A discusses the constitutional
floor placed on interrogations of civilian and police suspects. Section
B then considers how states and localities have installed heightened
protections for police officers during interrogations. These heightened
protections flow from several sources, including local collective bargaining agreements, 47 LEOBRs, 48 and civil service statutes. 49 This has
(discussing how civilians have organized in many American cities to videotape law enforcement

officers).
45 Richard A. Leo, Inside the InterrogationRoom, 86 J. CiuM. L. & CRMNOLOGY 266,
277-78 (1996) (finding that, in his observation of 182 interrogations, officers typically employed
5 or more interrogation tactics, including appealing to a suspect's self-interest, confronting the
suspect with evidence, identifying contradictions in the suspect's story, and occasionally yelling
or attempting to confuse the suspect).
46 Id. at 280 (finding that investigators successfully elicited incriminating statements, partial confessions, or full confessions in 117 of the 182 interrogations that Professor Leo observed).
47 See Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DuKE L.J. 1191, 1203-07 (2017) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Union Contracts] (describing the evolution of collective bargaining in the
context of American policing and internal disciplinary procedures).
48 Law Enforcement Officers' Bills of Rights ("LEOBRs") generally provide police officers with protections during internal disciplinary investigations. See, e.g., Kevin M. Keenan &

Samuel Walker, An Impediment to Police Accountability?An Analysis of Statutory Law Enforce-

ment Officers' Bills of Rights, 14 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 185, 185 (2005). One analysis from 2015
found that there were 14 states that have LEOBRs (depending on the definition of LEOBR).
See Hager, supra note 20. See generally FBI, FuLL-TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES BY
STATE (2015), https:H/ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-77
[https://perma.cc/NUS5-F5H8] (highlights the number of law enforcement officers employed in
each state).
49 There are several states that have civil service statutes that apply to local police officers.
See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1001, 1007 (1956) (creates a civil service system for police
officers); TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 143.001-143.403 (West 2008) (creates a civil service
system for police officers and fire department personnel). These civil service systems developed
the regulation of appointing and discharging public employees, which include police officers. See
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resulted in a sort of "distributive inequality" 50 between the interrogation protections afforded to civilians and police officers undergoing
similarly coercive interrogation conditions.
A.

Constitutional Limits on Interrogationsof Criminal Suspects and
DisciplinaryInterrogationsof Employees

While the U.S. Supreme Court has placed some limits on the interrogation tactics that investigators can use in criminal cases, 51 scholars have widely criticized these regulations as "narrow and weak." 52 In
Miranda v. Arizona,53 the Court famously held that the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination requires police officers to
notify suspects of four prophylactic warnings before beginning a custodial interrogation: (1) the right to remain silent, (2) notification that
anything a suspect says may be used against him in court, (3) the right
to have an attorney present during the interrogation, and (4) notification that if a suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed
free of charge.5 4 These protections only apply to formal, or "custodial"
interrogations. 55 But social scientists have shown that suspects fre56
quently waive their protections under Miranda.
In cases where suspects have waived their protections under Miranda, social scientists have found that police engage in a wide range
of psychologically manipulative tactics in order to elicit incriminating
statements. 57 Criminal suspects have attempted to challenge the use of
these tactics, but with little success. To determine whether an interrogation tactic is unconstitutionally coercive, the Court has adopted a
"totality of the circumstances" test, 58 which asks whether a confession
Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining Law in Public
Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REv. 95, 102-03 (1990).
50 Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2016).
51 See generally YALE KAMusAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (14th ed. 2015)
(describing the historical development of constitutional law that regulates police interrogations).
52 Kate Levine & Stephen Rushin, Interrogation Parity, 2018 U. Iiu. L. REv. 1685, 1691.
53 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
54 Id. at 471; Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRnM. L. & CRMIlNOLOGY

621, 628 (1996).

See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (holding that an "interrogation" only
happens when police expressly question a suspect or engage in equivalent conduct).
56 See Leo, supra note 45, at 276 (showing that 78% of the individuals observed by Professor Leo waived their protections under Miranda).
57 See id. at 277 (describing the frequency of interrogation techniques used in Leo's observations of police interrogations).
58 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1973) (asking courts to balance the
need for law enforcement effectiveness and the societal value of ensuring suspects voluntarily
and freely confess).
55
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was "voluntary." 59 Some tactics, like the use of physical force, clearly
implicate the voluntariness of a statement made during an interrogation. 60 Nevertheless, courts have found confessions to be voluntary in
many other questionable circumstances, including when the confession was the apparent product of "economic duress, lengthy interrogations, sleep deprivation combined with middle-of-the-night
questioning, refusal to allow basic physical necessities, lies about the
severity of charges or evidence in the case, threats to family members'
welfare, [and] inducements in the form of leniency or other
",61 While these represent the most extreme examples of
promises .
permissible interrogation techniques, modem police training materials
widely teach detectives to use subtle psychological techniques and deception to elicit incriminating statements from criminal suspects. 62
Of course, interrogations are not just used in criminal investigations. When an employer suspects that an employee has engaged in
misconduct (either criminal misconduct or violations of internal policies), an employer may attempt to question that employee as part of
an internal investigation. In the context of police departments, internal investigators commonly use these sorts of administrative interrogations to judge the veracity of civilian complaints, collect facts after
officer uses of force, and investigate apparent officer misconduct. The
Court has placed some limits on how internal investigators conduct
these interrogations of police officers. Although they cannot compel
criminal suspects, investigators can, and often do, compel officers to
answer questions during disciplinary interrogations. Failure to answer
a supervisor's question can result in an officer's termination for cause.
Nevertheless, such compelled questioning can raise serious Fifth
Amendment concerns when an officer is suspected of criminal conduct that may serve as the basis of both internal disciplinary action
and criminal prosecution. In such cases, the Court has held that the
government may not use a compelled statement by a police officer as
evidence in a criminal prosecution of that officer. 63 But outside of this
59 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (establishing the "voluntariness" doctrine under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine whether confessions are admissible based on a totality of the circumstances, which most importantly includes
the conduct of the police during interrogation).
60 See Leo, supra note 54, at 625.
61 Levine & Rushin, supra note 52, at 1693 (quoting Levine, supra note 50, at 1215-16).
62 See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. RaV. 891, 910, 918-19 (2004) (citing the Inbau et al. textbook on
interrogations).
63 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (holding that "protection ... against
coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent criminal proceedings of statements obtained
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constitutional limitation, employers are free to compel officers to undergo interrogations as part of internal investigations, subject to limitations placed on these interrogations by labor and employment laws.
The next Section explores these labor and employment limits on inter-

rogations of police officers.
B.

Regulations of DisciplinaryInterrogationsof Police Officers

Both local collective bargaining agreements and state laws limit
the tactics that can be used against police officers facing interrogations

related to disciplinary investigations. First, police union contracts
often regulate disciplinary interrogations. According to the most recent counts, approximately two-thirds of American police officers
work for police departments that authorize collective bargaining. 64
The overwhelming majority of American states permit or require the
unionization of police officers, 65 and most state statutes on the topic
allow officers to bargain collectively about "matters of wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment . . . ."66 Courts and
under threat of removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or
other members of our body politic").
64 More specifically, about 66 percent of police officers work for police departments that
take part in collective bargaining negotiations. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 13 (rev. ed. 2011), http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdfllpd07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EFB8-TMSJ].
65

See generally MiLLA

SANES & JOHN ScHMrrr, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POLICY RESEARCH,

5, 12-68 (2014),
http://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-03.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5DA-EERU]. Most
states permit or require municipalities to bargain collectively with police unions. Forty-one states
and the District of Columbia have statutes that require or permit police departments at the local
level to bargain collectively with police unions about various employment terms and conditions.
See id.
66 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070(2) (2016); see also Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 5-271(a)
(West 2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1601, 1602(n) (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.309(1)
(West 2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-9(a) (2012); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 315/2 (West 2013);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 36-8-22-3, 36-8-22-8 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9(1) (WEST 2010);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 67A.6902(1) (West 2006); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 6 (LexisNexis
2016); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.215(1) (West 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179A.03, subd.
19, 179A.06, subd. 5 (West 2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-305(2) (2017); NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48-816(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 288.150(2) (LexisNexis 2017);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 273-A:1, 273-A:3 (2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-5.3, 34:13A-23
(West 2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-7E-17(A)(1) (2017); N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 204(2)-(3)
(McKinney 2011); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.03(A)(4) (West 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
11, § 51-101(A) (West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.650(7)(a), 243.662 (West 2012); 43 PA.
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 217.1 (West 2009); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-9.2-4 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 3-18-3 (2013); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 174.002(b) (West 2016); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 34-19-1(1) (LexisNexis 2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1725(a) (2016); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 41.56.030, 41.56.040, 51.56.030(4) (West 2016).
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state labor relations boards commonly interpret terms like "conditions

of employment" to give officers the ability to bargain collectively
about a broad range of topics, including limitations on how supervisors can interrogate officers during internal disciplinary investigations.67 Thus, as a practical matter, police union contracts are one of

the primary vehicles by which police unions have been able to secure
protections for officers facing disciplinary interrogations, as well as
other procedural protections limiting investigations, suspensions, and
terminations.
Second, many states have enacted statutes that regulate interrogations of police officers. 68 These state laws generally fall into two categories. 69 Many states have civil service statutes that regulate
"demotions, transfers, layoffs and recalls, discharges, training, salary

administration, attendance control, safety, grievances, pay and benefit
67 See, e.g., City of Reno v. Reno Police Protective Ass'n, 653 P.2d 156, 157-58 (Nev. 1982)
(holding that the local city government had to collectively bargain with police municipalities
over disciplinary procedures as required by Nevada law); Union Twp. Bd. of Trs. v. Fraternal
Order of Police, Ohio Valley Lodge No. 112, 766 N.E.2d 1027, 1031-32 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that disciplinary procedures must be bargained collectively, and in the end, a thirdparty mediator could decide which disciplinary procedures to include in the final agreement).
But c.f, Local 346, Int'l Bhd. of Police Officers v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 462 N.E.2d 96, 102
(Mass. 1984) (exempting polygraph usage from terms of collective bargaining process); State v.
State Troopers Fraternal Ass'n, 634 A.2d 478, 479, 493 (N.J. 1993) (limiting subjects appropriate
for collective bargaining for police in cases of disciplinary investigations). It is also worth noting
that in most communities, "unions are selected and govern on a majority rule principle"-that is,
"the union chosen by the majority of employees in a job classification or department... is the
exclusive representative of all the employees in that unit." Catherine L. Fisk & L. Song Richardson, Police Unions, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 712, 738 (2017). These bargaining representatives
have often prioritized rules that prevent management from exercising its disciplinary authority
arbitrarily. See id Such a focus is understandable, as a number of scholars have criticized the
apparently arbitrary nature of internal disciplinary action in local police departments. Prior studies have found that a significant number of police union contracts have been successful in apparently limiting the ability of supervisors to engage in such arbitrary behavior by carefully
regulating the intake of civilian complaints, the behavior of investigators during interrogations of
officers suspected of misconduct, the retention of personnel files, the adjudication of disciplinary
action and disciplinary appeals, and the indemnification of officers facing civil suits for misconduct. See generally Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 47, at 1221-39.
68 See Levine & Rushin, supra note 52, at 1689 ("It appears that as many as twenty or

more states have enacted LEOBRs that explicitly protect officers during internal investigations."). It is worth noting that other studies have found a smaller number of LEOBRs. Hager,
supra note 20. This difference in the apparent number of LEOBRs may be attributable to different studies using different definitions of LEOBRs.
69 See Hodges, supra note 49, at 100 (explaining there are "two statutory schemes--collective bargaining and civil service"); see also Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 185 (providing
that through their respective "collective bargaining representatives" police officers gained employee protections against "investigations for official misconduct" through codified LEOBRs).
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determination, and classification of positions .... ,,70 But civil service
statutes only occasionally touch on the kinds of procedures police departments must follow in conducting officer interrogations. A smaller
number of states, though, have enacted LEOBRs, which provide officers with an additional layer of procedural protections during internal investigations and disciplinary actions above and beyond those
71
given to other government employees through civil service statutes.
These LEOBRs frequently include limitations on the interrogation of
72
officers suspected of misconduct.
As the next Part discusses, a number of prior scholars have written on the internal disciplinary protections afforded to officers in
union contracts, LEOBRs, and civil service laws. But within this literature, few have comprehensively and empirically examined the interrogation protections afforded to police officers facing internal
investigations, nor have many empirically examined whether these
protections impede accountability.

II.

THE

EXISTING LITERATURE ON INTERROGATIONS OF POLICE
OFFICERS

A handful of prior studies have examined how collective bargaining agreements and LEOBRs protect police officers during disciplinary interrogations. Professor Samuel Walker has written multiple
examinations, both published and unpublished, that explore the ways
that some municipalities limit officer interrogations. 73 In an unpublished manuscript, Professor Walker argued that there is no scientific
evidence to support the proposition that delays of disciplinary interviews improve officer memory. 74 Professor Walker has also teamed up
with Kevin M. Keenan to consider the ways that LEOBRs regulate
70

Hodges, supra note 49, at 102.

See Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 185-86 (LEOBRs "have succeeded in gaining a
special layer of employee due process protections when [police officers are] faced with investigations for official misconduct ... [and] some LEOBRs grant police officers more specific protections than are provided other public employees .... ").
72 Id.; see Levine & Rushin, supra note 52, at 1689 (noting how the approximately 20
existing LEOBRs frequently touch on this topic).
71

73 See, e.g., Samuel Walker, The Baltimore Police Union Contract and the Law Enforcement Officers's Bill of Rights: Impediments to Accountability (May 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/BALTIMOREPOLICE-UNION-CONTRACTFinal.pdf [https:/perma.cc/X45J-3QZN]) (providing a detailed
breakdown of the Baltimore police union contract and the Maryland LEOBR to show how each
impedes effective investigation for alleged officer misconduct).
74

Walker, supra note 19.
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officer interrogations. 75 That study found that multiple LEOBRs delay
officer interrogation about suspected wrongdoing. 76 Civil rights activists DeRay McKesson, Samuel Sinyangwe, Johnetta Elzie, and Brittany Packnett have done critically important work in collecting and
analyzing police union contract language from 81 large American police departments. 77 Their study objected to a wide range of limitations
on the ability of investigators to question officers suspected of misconduct. 78 Specifically, they took issue with portions of union contracts
and LEOBRs that provide officers with any protections not guaranteed to civilians or that otherwise give officers protections from accountability, including provisions that delay interrogations, limit the
kinds of language that can be used during interrogations, limit the
length of interrogations, discourage interrogations at unusual hours,
ensure officers have access to personal necessities, guarantee officers
access to a recorded copy of the interrogation, provide access to incriminating evidence, and more. 79 Major news outlets, including
Reuters80 and The Guardian,81 conducted similar examinations of po-

lice union contracts, finding that some regulated how investigators
could interrogate police officers. Professors Aziz Huq and Richard

McAdams have written about the effect of interrogation delays-or as
they refer to them "interrogation buffers"-on officer accountability.8 2 Their study considered creative ways that attorneys and advo-

75 Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 203-23 (examining the legal protections in LEOBRs for officers by reviewing several state LEOBRs, which includes discussion on the investigation processes of an officer suspected of misconduct).
76 See id. at 212.
77 DeRay McKesson, Samuel Sinyangwe, Johnetta Elzie & Brittany Packnett, Police
Union Contracts and Police Bill of Rights Analysis, CAMPAIGN ZERO (June 29, 2016), https://
staticl.squarespace.com/static/559fbf2be4b8efl97467542/t/5773f695f7eabbdfe28a1f/14672175
60243/Campaign+Zero+Police+Union+Contract+Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/DR7X-2QWW].
78

Id.

79

Id.

80 Reade Levinson, Across the U.S., Police Contracts Shield Officers from Scrutiny and
Discipline,REUTERS (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:18 PM), http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/
usa-police-unions [https://perma.cc/5UZ3-BTR3] (evaluating a dataset of 82 police union contracts from some of the largest cities in the United States and explaining how they may impair
internal investigations).
81 George Joseph, Leaked Police Files Contain Guarantees Disciplinary Records Will Be
Kept Secret, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 7, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2016/feb/07/leaked-police-files-contain-guarantees-disciplinary-records-will-be-kept-secret
[https://perma.cc/JB94-796D] (detailing questionable clauses found in union contracts revealed
as part of the hack of the Fraternal Order of Police).
82 See Aziz Z. Huq & Richard H. McAdams, Litigating the Blue Wall of Silence: How to
Challenge the Police Privilege to Delay Investigation, 2016 U. Ci. LEGAL F. 213, 220.
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cates could fight back against these provisions.83 Professors Catherine
L. Fisk and L. Song Richardson reviewed the content of a handful of
police union contracts in a recent study. 84 In their study, they expressed some concern about the effect of interrogation delays on officer accountability. 85 Finally, Professor Stephen Rushin similarly
noted that many police union contracts delayed officer interrogations
for rigid periods of time and provided officers with access to potentially incriminating evidence. 86
These studies provide compelling evidence to suggest that police
union contracts and LEOBRs frequently regulate the methods by
which investigators may interrogate officers about suspected wrongdoing. 87 Nevertheless, these existing studies do not foreclose the need
for additional research into this topic. This Article addresses that need
in four ways. First, this study builds on the methodology employed by
previous studies.88 It relies on a substantially larger dataset of police
union contracts than most of the previous studies. This allows for this
study to draw somewhat more generalizable conclusions about the
commonality of these limits on interrogation procedures for police officers, across a more diverse range of American police departments.
This also allows us to examine whether geography, demographics, or
other characteristics affect the likelihood of a police department giving generous protections to police officers during interrogations.
Second, as discussed in more depth in Part IV, this Article also
relies on a wide range of variables related specifically to police interrogations. Third, this Article conducts a national survey of police officers to understand whether these limitations on interrogations of
police officers actually impair accountability and oversight efforts.8 9
And finally, by comparing our data to leading interrogation manuals,
this Article makes several normative recommendations about how
municipalities ought to approach the regulation of interrogations of
police officer suspects. 90 In this way, this Article makes a unique contribution to the existing literature and builds on the growing body of
83
84
85
86
87

Id. at 240-52.
See Fisk & Richardson, supra note 67.
Id. at 750-51.
Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 47, at 1220-22.
See generally supra text accompanying notes 63, 65-70, 71-74.

88 See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text; see also Appendix A. See generally supra
notes 67, 69-70, 71, 73.
89 See infra Sections III.B, IV.C.

90 Infra Part V.
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research in this important field. The next Part discusses the specific

methodology employed in this Article.
III. METHODOLOGY

This Article seeks to answer two separate research questions.
First, the Article examines the kind of interrogation protections that

police officers have secured via the collective bargaining process and
through LEOBRs. Second, the Article considers whether these pro-

tections limit the ability of investigators to uncover the truth or otherwise burden internal disciplinary investigations. To answer these

questions, this Article employs multiple empirical methodologies, as
described in subsections that follow.
A.

Content Analysis to Identify Common Types of Interrogation
Protections

To better understand the kind of interrogation protections offered to police officers across the United States, this Article relies on a
dataset of police union contracts collected between 2014 and 201791
and all existing LEOBRs as of 2016. 92 Consistent with other recent
studies of police policies, this dataset focuses on municipal police de-

partments, rather than sheriff's departments, state highway patrols, or
other specialized law enforcement agencies. 93 Public record requests,
searches of municipal websites, searches of state repositories, and web
searches resulted in the collection of police union contracts from 657

municipal agencies serving communities with around 30,000 residents
or more.94 A complete list of the departments studied as part of this
91 Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 47, at 1217-18. One of the authors of this
study has employed this same dataset in two other prior projects. See id. at 1217 (using a segment
of this dataset to analyze how union contracts can impede officer accountability in departments
serving communities with at least 100,000 residents); see also Stephen Rushin, Police Disciplinary Appeals, 167 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Rushin, Police Disciplinary
Appeals] (using this same dataset of contracts to analyze how union contracts establish a disciplinary-appeals process that may impede accountability).
92 Huq & McAdams, supra note 82, at 222 (providing a list of the 20 existing LEOBRs
identified in their study that regulate interrogations).
93 See, e.g., Mary D. Fan, Privacy, Public Disclosure, Police Body Cameras: Policy Splits,
68 ALA. L. REv. 395, 423-24 (2016) (analyzing police body camera policies from the largest 100
municipal police departments and limiting analysis to municipal agencies rather than other law
enforcement agencies); Rushin, Police Union Contracts,supra note 47, at 1218-19 (similarly limiting study to municipal agencies); Rushin, Police DisciplinaryAppeals, supra note 91, at 23-24
(also looking exclusively at municipal police departments).
94 Approximately 61% of these contracts come from municipal websites, 18% from state
websites, 5% from police association or union websites, 2% from media reports, and 11% from
public record requests. Roughly 3% of these contracts were only available through previous
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dataset is available in the Appendix. This dataset covers 40 states and
the District of Columbia. This dataset builds on the important efforts
of other researchers who have also collected police union contracts,
including the Better Government Association, 95 Campaign Zero, 96 the
Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas, 97 The Guardian,"
Labor Relations Information Systems, 99 and Reuters.0 0
Although this dataset provides a relatively comprehensive look at
the types of protections afforded to officers in unionized, municipal
police departments serving communities with around 30,000 residents
or more, it is not necessarily generalizable to all law enforcement
agencies. 1°1 Policies in smaller and nonunionized departments may differ from the departments studied in this dataset. 10 2 To begin analyzing
the content of the contracts in this data, we next identified variables.
To do this, we first surveyed the existing literature, consulted leading
interrogation manuals, and conducted a preliminary examination of
the dataset to identify language regulating officer interrogations in police union contracts and LEOBRs that may impair oversight and
accountability.
First, we observed that provisions in union contracts and LEOBRs that delay officer interrogations may raise accountability conunion contract collections by other organizations like the Better Government Association, Campaign Zero, The Guardian,Labor Relations Information Systems, and Reuters, all of which make
some contracts available online. The municipal departments covered in this dataset serve as the
primary law enforcement agency for around 97 million Americans. The median population
served by this dataset is around 68,000 residents. See Rushin, Police DisciplinaryAppeals, supra
note 91, at 63 (using this same dataset).
95 The Better Government Association previously published a Collective Bargaining
Database. As of the time of this Article, the Database appears to no longer be publicly available,
but we thank the Better Government Association for providing the public with this great resource for many years. BETrER GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATION, Collective Bargaining Database,
http://www.bettergov.org/collective-bargaining-database [https://perma.cc/Q78P-WAW3] (collected and made available contracts from Chicago and surrounding areas).
96 McKesson et al., supra note 77 (collecting and coding 81 police union contracts from the
largest 100 municipal police departments).
97 COMBINED LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATIONS OF TExAS, CONTRACTS, https://
www.cleat.org/contracts [https://perma.cc/JG65-QMCK] (making numerous contracts from
Texas available through their website).
98 Joseph, supra note 81 (discussing the contents of 67 contracts leaked as part of a hack of
the Fraternal Order of Police).
99 LABOR RELATIONS
INFORMATION
SYSTEM,
LRIS PUBLIC SAFETY CONRACT
DATABASE, https://www.lris.com/contracts/index.php [https://perma.cc/3YC5-USLA] (providing
a database of union contracts from a number of police departments across the country).
100 Levinson, supra note 80 (collecting and coding 82 contracts from the largest 100 municipal police departments in the United States).
101 See Rushin, Police DisciplinaryAppeals, supra note 91, at 64.
102 Id.
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cerns. 10 3 Many previous scholars have worried that delaying
interrogations of police officers after alleged misconduct may impede
accountability. But prior researchers have disagreed about which
types of delays present accountability concerns. 10 4 If a police depart-

ment wants to interrogate an officer about criminal behavior, the of10 5
ficer is entitled to an attorney like any other criminal suspect.
Additionally, if a police department forces an officer to answer ques-

tions during an interrogation, the Constitution provides limits on the
ability of prosecutors to use such compulsory statements in later criminal prosecutions. 10 6 Because of this, internal investigators must often

ensure that an officer suspected of misconduct has the opportunity to
secure representation before an interview or interrogation. 1°7 In our
judgment, and as discussed in more detail in Part IV, contracts that
provide officers with a reasonable length of time to secure representa-

tion before an interview present no accountability issues.
But at least one prior study of police union contracts has distinguished between those that provide officers with "reasonable" delays,
and those that allow officers to delay interrogations for set lengths of
time, regardless of the circumstances. 10 8 In our judgment, officers are
more likely to abuse contractual language that delays officer inter-

views for set lengths of time. 1°9 These rigid time allotments create a
See supra Part II.
See Huq & McAdams, supra note 82 (discussing throughout some of the objections to
delays of officer interrogations in cases of alleged misconduct); see also Fisk & Richardson, supra
note 67, at 750 (also identifying possible objections to the general concept of delays in interrogations); Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 212-14 (expressing concern about delays of officer
interrogations); McKesson et al., supra note 77, at 2-3; Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra
note 47, at 1224-28 (describing some of the objections to delaying officer interrogations).
105 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966) (establishing a right to four prophylactic warnings in the event police attempt to elicit incriminating information from a suspect during
a custodial interrogation).
106 See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967).
107 See Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 212.
108 See, e.g., Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 47, at 1224-25 (arguing that contracts that only provide for a "reasonable" delay period may present a lower risk than those that
elaborate a strict time limitation). It is also worth noting that other studies have not seemingly
distinguished delay provisions in this manner. See McKesson et al., supra note 77, at 5-6 (grouping together a wider range of provisions that allow officers to have any sort of delay before an
interrogation).
109 Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra note 47, at 1224-25 (stating that "[w]hile 'reasonable' waiting periods to allow officers to secure representation could be abused, in my estimation, waiting periods that designate set lengths of time are more inflexible and therefore even
more troublesome"); see also Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 212-14 (arguing that departments should give officers a "reasonable period prior to a formal interrogation to secure representation," but should prohibit prolonged delays to avoid collusion and the coordination of
stories).
103
104
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greater likelihood that officers may be able to use a delay period to
coordinate stories in a manner that could circumvent accountability.
Thus, we settled on two coding definitions related to interrogation delays. The first variable looks at whether the contract includes any stipulation that delays officer interviews or interrogations after alleged
wrongdoing for a set length of time. The second variable codes the
contracts for the length of the typical delay (in hours) before an
interrogation.
Second, we found that provisions in union contracts and LEOBRs granting officers access to information before an interrogation
may raise accountability concerns. 110 There is general agreement in
the existing literature that providing officers with access to incriminating evidence before an interrogation could serve as a barrier to reasonable oversight and accountability."' But within these existing
studies, researchers have often disagreed as to what kind of evidence
investigators should not provide to officers before an interrogation.
Some prior researchers have taken an expansive view on this question,
understandably arguing that police officers should not be given additional protections beyond those afforded to civilians." z For example,
some researchers object to contracts that give officers access to copies
of recordings from interrogations 11 3 and contracts that give officers a
1 4
basic summary of the circumstances that led to an interrogation.
We take a narrower view than some prior researchers of the circumstances that may raise accountability concerns. For example, we
think it is unlikely that recording an interrogation presents any meaningful barrier to accountability-instead, we think this is a norma115
tively desirable policy as we describe in more detail in Section V.A.
We also do not object to any contractual language that gives officers a
basic appraisal of the reason for an investigative interview. We do not
believe these kinds of provisions will frequently impair the ability of
an interrogator to elicit incriminating statements in a humane manner.
110 See generally Rushin, Police Union Contracts,supra note 47.
111 See, e.g., McKesson et al., supra note 77, at 4-6 (including a variable for the provision of
evidence not provided to civilians before interrogations); Rushin, Police Union Contracts, supra
note 47, at 1220, 1224-28.
112 See, e.g., McKesson et al., supra note 77.
113 Id. at 5-6 (identifying North Las Vegas, Wichita, Tulsa, and Tucson as just a few of the
cities that fall into this category).
114 Id. (identifying Lincoln, Nebraska as having a problematic contractual term, in part
because it provides officers with information about the nature of a complaint before an
interrogation).
115 On this point, we adopt the view of Professor Kate Levine. Levine, supra note 50, at
1212 (arguing that LEOBRs should be a model for how we ought to treat criminal suspects).

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:646

In fact, leading interrogation manuals recommend that investigators
6
provide civilian suspects with such basic information."
But in our initial examination of the dataset, we noticed that a
large number of contracts give officers the right to obtain potentially
incriminating information. By obtaining this information in advance of
an interrogation, we believe these contractual terms may allow officers to circumvent effective interrogation techniques. For coding
purposes, we settled on four major types of evidence we believe fit
into this category: (1) a copy of the civilian complaint that serves as
the basis of the interview, (2) the name of any or all complainants,
(3) photographic or video evidence, and (4) GPS or locational data.
Combined, we believe that these four variables allow us to identify
and categorize a wide range of contractual language that gives officers
access to potentially incriminating evidence, likely creating a barrier
to oversight and accountability.
Third, a number of prior studies argue that other limitations of
interrogations may impede officer accountability. After consulting the
literature on false confessions and leading interrogation manuals, we
decided not to code for any of these variables, as we do not believe
they raise significant accountability concerns. For example, other researchers in the field have objected to contractual language that limits
the use of abusive language or threats," 7 limits the number of officers
that can interrogate an officer," 8 allows officers to tend to personal
necessities like bathroom use, 119 restricts the ability of investigators to

interrogate officers outside of reasonable work hours except in exigent circumstances,12 0 or prevents interrogations from lasting an un-

reasonable length of time. 121 No doubt, it is troubling that civilians are
not always guaranteed many of these protections during custodial interrogations. The desire for parity between officer and civilian interro116 See, e.g., Christopher Haney & Andrea Roller, Investigative Interview Techniques, DuFF
& PELPs (2012), https://www.duffandphelps.com/-/media/assets/pdfs/publications/disputes-andinvestigations/investigative-interview-techniques.ashx [https://perma.cc/P7L5-ZRD8].
117 See McKesson et al., supra note 77 (for example, objecting to portions of the Albuquerque contract that limit the use of offensive language and coercion and portions of the Buffalo
contract that prevent threatening or offensive language).
118 See, e.g., id. (citing Jacksonville and Louisville as jurisdictions that offer such
protections).
119 See, e.g., id. (identifying such provisions in the contracts in Buffalo, Chicago, Corpus
Christi, Hialeah, and Honolulu).
120 See, e.g., id. (citing Milwaukee and Columbus as examples of jurisdictions that provide

such protections for officers).
121

See, e.g., id. (identifying these sorts of provisions in the Chicago, Columbus, and Corpus

Christi contracts).
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gations is understandable. Nevertheless, we fail to find any evidence
in the existing literature or leading interrogation manuals to suggest
that these sorts of restrictions on interrogations present meaningful
barriers to accountability.
In our judgment, no person-be they an officer or a civilianought to be subject to abusive language or threats during interrogations. No one should be subject to unreasonably long interrogations at
unusual hours. No one should be denied the opportunity to use the
bathroom or tend to other personal necessities. And ideally, all interrogations should be recorded.
We discuss the reasons for these beliefs in more detail in Part V.
Even if the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee each of these protections to civilian suspects in all cases, we do not support removing these
protections from officers facing internal investigations. While parity
between officer and civilian interrogations may be normatively desirable, this desire for parity should not lead us on a race to the bottom.
On this point, we tend to side with Professor Kate Levine, who has
persuasively argued that these sorts of protections are "more in line
with our current notions of humane treatment of those who are suspected of violating the criminal law. ' 122 Thus, we focus our content
analysis on provisions in union contracts and LEOBRs that, in our
judgment, raise more significant accountability concerns. Table 1 summarizes the variable names and definitions we employed in our coding
for this Article.
TABLE 1. CODING VARIABLES AND DEFINITIONS

Definition
The contract or LEOBR includes any stipulation that
delays officer interviews or interrogations after alleged
wrongdoing for a set length of time, or requires rigid
procedural hurdles that achieve the same result
Approximate length of time in hours of the typical
Length of Typical Delay
delay before an interrogation
Before Interrogation
The contract or LEOBR provides officers with access
Provides Officers with
Access to Evidence Before to any evidence before interviews or interrogations
Interrogation or Interview about alleged wrongdoing, defined as anything more
Variable
Delays Interrogation or
Interview

than a summary or appraisal of the basic

Access to Complaint

facts

The contract or LEOBR provides officers with a copy
of a complaint before an interrogation or interview

Access to Names of Complainants

The contract or LEOBR provides officers with the
name of a complainant before an interrogation or
Iinterview

122

Levine, supra note 50, at 1211-12.
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The contract or LEOBR provides officers with video
or photographic evidence related to alleged misconduct before an interrogation or interview
The contract or LEOBR provides officers with global
positioning system evidence or vehicle locational data
before an interrogation or interview

This study employed three coders to evaluate our dataset of 657
contracts according to the variable definitions listed in Table 1.123 We
found that the three coders used as part of this project demonstrated
high levels of intercoder reliability. All contracts underwent two
rounds of coding. In a small handful of cases where these two independent rounds of coding resulted in conflicting coding results, the
contract underwent a third and final round of coding.
In total, our coders made 4,599 coding decisions. We identified
less than one percent of these coding decisions to be borderline
cases-that is cases where the contractual term did not neatly fit into
one of the definitions listed in Table 1. These borderline cases underwent additional analysis, requiring us to use our best judgment. Given
the relatively small number of such borderline cases and the large
number of contracts in our dataset, we believe that they do not significantly affect the cumulative results of our study.
B.

Surveying Police Officers to Evaluate the Effects of
Interrogation Protections

After identifying the package of procedural protections afforded
to officers during investigatory interviews through our content analysis, the second part of this paper seeks to answer a different empirical
question: do these limitations on interrogation techniques impair the
ability of investigators to uncover the truth or elicit incriminating
statements? Unfortunately, there is no easy way to answer this question. Ideally, an empirical examination of this research question would
involve a controlled experiment where researchers vary the use of
these procedural protections to determine whether their use hampers
the ability of interrogators to uncover incriminating information. But
such an experiment is impractical. Instead, this Article employs a different methodological approach.
We conducted a survey of American law enforcement leaders to
assess whether they believe that these sorts of procedural protections
123 We originally employed four coders. One coder, though, showed low levels of intercoder reliability. Thus, we removed this coder's responses from our dataset and reconducted
our analysis according to the methodology described in this Section.
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impede effective investigations or otherwise impair the ability of an
interrogator to uncover the truth. We defined law enforcement leaders
as the head of any police agency at the municipal level (typically police chiefs), focusing specifically on municipal police departmentsthat is, police departments generally serving incorporated cities,
towns, and villages. The average rank-and-file officer may not have
prior experience conducting custodial interrogations.1 24 By contrast,
we believe that police chiefs are well positioned among the law enforcement community to provide valuable feedback to our survey
questions. Police chiefs generally have extensive prior experience in
various roles in a police agency.125 Police chiefs are also different from
the average rank-and-file officer in that they must regularly consider
the implementation of regulations of officer behavior. Thus, we believe that police leaders can draw on their prior experiences to judge
the potential effects of interrogation regulations.
To identify these municipal police chiefs, we rely on a database of
all law enforcement agencies in the United States compiled by a com126
mercial agency, the National Public Safety Information Bureau.
This database includes the names and contact information for heads of
around 22,000 state and local law enforcement agencies across the
country (including municipal city police departments, county sheriff's
offices, state troopers, state highway patrols, and more), of which
around 12,500 were designated as municipal law enforcement agencies. 1 27 The number of agencies identified by this commercial database
is roughly consistent with the number of agencies identified by the
Bureau of Justice Statistics in its semiregular Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. 28 This gives us reasonably high confi-

124

See

ROD GEHL

&

DARRYL PLECAS, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION:

PROCESSES, PRACTICES AND THINKING 122 (2016).
125 E.g., CITY OF MARINA, CAL., Chief of Police, https://www.ci.marina.ca.us/Document
Center/View/437/Chief-of-Police?bidld [https://perma.cc/ZHP4-3C36] (describing the role and
necessary qualifications of city's police chief).
126

NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION BUREAU,

ENFORCEMENT

ADMINISTRATORS,

NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LAW

http://www.safetysource.com/directories/index.cfm

[https://

perma.cc/DPW8-TRU9].
127

See id.

128 BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 233982, CENSUS OF STATE
AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 12 (2011) (stating that there are more than
20,000 state and local law enforcement agencies potentially operating as of 2008). The commercial database contained between 21,830 and 22,229 state and local agencies, depending on how
you define law enforcement agencies that serve transportation areas like railroads, harbors, and
airports. NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION BUREAU, supra note 126.
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dence that this commercial database contains contact information for
129
nearly all state and local law enforcement agencies in the country.
We drew from this commercial database a random sample of 550
leaders from municipal law enforcement agencies across the country.
This random sample represents a demographically and geographically
diverse cross section of American police departments from 48 states.
We mailed this survey instrument in June 2018. In the weeks that followed, we received a 28.4% response rate, resulting in the collection
of survey responses from 156 police leaders across the country.1 3
Our survey instrument asked police leaders three standard questions. First, we asked participants whether waiting periods before an
interrogation burdens an investigation or otherwise limits the ability
of interrogators to uncover the truth. Second, we asked participants
whether providing suspects with access to potentially incriminating evidence before an interrogation burdens an investigation or otherwise
limits the ability of interrogators to uncover the truth. And third, we
asked participants whether either of these protections may be useful
in reducing the rates of false confessions. A full version of an example
survey instrument is in Appendix B.
We recognize that, as heads of law enforcement agencies, police
leaders may be incentivized to misrepresent the harmful effects of
procedural limits on officer interrogations. After all, such protections
serve as a limitation on the ability of police leaders to exercise control
over disciplinary matters. To address this, we designed our survey instrument so as to not ask law enforcement leaders about their opinions of interrogations of police officers. Rather, our survey instrument
is careful to only ask law enforcement leaders about whether such limits on interrogations generally would burden investigations (criminal
or otherwise), limit the ability of interrogators to uncover the truth, or
contribute to a reduction in false confessions. Thus, our goal in ad129 The National Public Safety Information Bureau updates their database annually. NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY INFORMATION BUREAU, supra note 126. Thus, while some survey respondents may move or change positions, we feel confident that this survey instrument
ultimately reached our sample given our reasonably high response rate.
130 We believe that this number of responses allows us to make generalizable conclusions
about the opinions of the underlying population. Ideally, we would have collected more responses. But we had limited funding available. Given that there are around 12,500 municipal law
enforcement agencies in the United States, our survey has an 8% margin of error, assuming a
95% confidence interval. This is slightly higher than we would have preferred. Nevertheless, our
survey responses, as discussed in more detail in Section IV.C, showed remarkable uniformity.
Regardless of this margin of error, we feel confident in claiming that the overwhelming majority
of American police leaders believe that these regulations impair investigations or otherwise limit
the ability of investigators to uncover the truth.
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ministering this survey is to understand whether, regardless of the target of an interrogation, police leaders believe that these procedural
limits on interrogator authority impair investigations. In the Part that
follows, we discuss the results from our multimethod examination.
IV.

How

OFFICER INTERROGATION PROCEDURES LIMIT
ACCOUNTABILITY

We find that a substantial number of jurisdictions in our dataset
provide officers with a designated waiting period before disciplinary
interrogations. Among departments that delay interrogations of police
officers, the median agency provides officers with at least 48 hours of
notice before an interrogation. A substantial number of police departments also provide officers with access to some types of potentially
incriminating evidence before initiating an interrogation, including the
civilian complaint and the complainants' names. Far fewer jurisdictions permit officers to have access to GPS evidence or video and photographic evidence. Table 2 summarizes the key findings from our
content analysis.
TABLE 2. INTERROGATION PROTECTIONS GIVEN TO OFFICERS
ACROSS DATASET OF POLICE UNION CONTRACTS AND
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER BILLS OF RIGHTS
Variable
Delays Interrogation

Provides Officers with
Access to Evidence Before

Frequency
20.9%
(137/657)

28.0%
(184/657)

Interrogation

Access to Complaint

21.5%
(141/657)

Access to Names of Corn-

21.5%

plainants

(141/657)

Access to Video or Photo-

11.6%

graphic Evidence

(76/657)

Access to GPS Evidence

10.0%
(66/657)

Virtually all police leaders who responded to our survey instrument claimed that any of the provisions described in Table 2 would
frequently or occasionally burden investigations or otherwise impede
the search for the truth. And almost all survey respondents claimed
that these protections would not reduce the risk of a suspect falsely
confessing. Sections A and B discuss the results of our content analy-
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sis and Section C presents the data from our national survey of law
enforcement leaders.
A.

Delays in Interrogations

Around one in five jurisdictions have police union contracts or
LEOBRs that delay officer interrogations for a designated period of
time. Of these, the median jurisdiction delays interrogations for
around 48 hours, while the average department delays interrogations
for around 67 hours. In other words, the typical police department in
our dataset gives officers two days or more of notice before it may
conduct an interrogation related to alleged misconduct. Some agencies offer substantially longer delays. For example, the Bowling
Green, Ohio contract states that officers should receive around 120
hours of notice before they face disciplinary interviews. 31 Norman,
Oklahoma typically gives officers 240 hours of notice.1 32 Officers in
Palm Bay, Florida may have as many as 504 hours of notice before
they face an interrogation. 133 And in Seattle, the union contract can
delay officer interrogation for 720 hours. 34
135
ClifAgencies in other cities like Albuquerque, New Mexico,
138
137
136
ton, New Jersey, DeKalb, Illinois, Elk Grove, Illinois,' Gahanna,
131

CITY OF BOWLING

GREEN, OHIO,

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE

CITY OF BOWLING

GREEN, Omo AN'D THE BOWLING GREEN POLICE PATROLMAN'S ASSOCIATION

https://www.bgohio.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/BGPPA.pdf
XFDF] (allowing a five-day delay for interrogations of officers).
132

OPBA 6 (2014),

[https://perma.cc/ZM3H-

CITY OF NORMAN, OKLA., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF NORMAN, OKLAHOMA

AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE - LODGE No. 122, at 6 (2016), http://www.normanok.

gov/filebrowser download/681/Human%20Resources/FOP%2Contract%20FYE%2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MW48-LYCF] (providing officers with ten working days to secure representation before they can be interviewed about suspected misconduct).
133 CITY OF PALM BAY, FLA., AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF PALM BAY, FLORIDA
AND FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, FLORIDA STATE LODGE, POLICE OFFIcER'S UNIr 29 (2014)

(on file with author) (giving officers seven days to schedule an interview with internal affairs and
allowing that interview to be as many as fourteen days after the officer contacts internal affairs,
potentially resulting in a twenty-one-day delay in some cases).
134 CITY OF SEATTLE, AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF SEATTLE AND SEATTLE
GUILD 9-10 (2014), https://www.seattle.gov/personnel/resources/pubs/
OFFICERS'
SPOGCBA_2015-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RXN-LXUG] (requiring that officers receive a
classification report before an interrogation and allowing up to thirty days for the receipt and
review of this classification report before an interrogation may happen).
135 See CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE AND ALBUQUERQUE POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 32 (2016), https://www.cabq.gov/
[https://
humanresources/documents/albuquerquepoliceofficersassociationcontract20l4l5.pdf
perma.cc/2ZPK-7M4B] (giving officers two hours to obtain representation before an interview).
136 See CITY OF CLIFTON, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF CLIFTON, PASSAIC COUNTY,
NEW JERSEY AND PBA LOCAL #36, at 17-18 (2012) (on file with author) (giving officers up to
two hours to consult with an attorney before an interview).
POLICE
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Ohio,'1 3 9 Hempstead, New York, 140 Tempe, Arizona,'141 Washington,

D.C.,'142 and West Des Moines, Iowa 143 provide officers with far
shorter delays of between 30 minutes and two hours before disciplinary interviews. While the median department provides officers with a
48-hour waiting period, the data appear to follow a bimodal distribution, as shown in the figure. A substantial number of police depart-

ments provide two hours or less, with many of the remaining agencies
giving police officers a substantially longer delay before facing questions from internal investigators-generally between 24 and 72 hours.
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERROGATION DELAYS ACROSS DATASET OF
POLICE UNION CONTRACTS
35.1%
28.7%

19.1%
13.8%
I3.2%

Si

137

i

i

2 hours

3-12

13-24

25-48

More than

or less

hours

hours

hours

48 hours

See CITY

OF DEKALB, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF DEKALB AND DEKALB FRA-

115, ILLINOIS FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LABOR COUNCIL 16 (2016), https://www.cityofdekalb.com/DocumentCenter/View/5370/FOP-Contract-fromJuly-1-2016-to-December-31-2019?bidld [https://perma.cc/X39F-JW56] (providing two-hour delay).
138 See VILL. OF ELK GROVE, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE OF
POLICE ELK GROVE VILLAGE POLICE CHAPTER #141 AND VILLAGE OF ELK GROVE VILLAGE 6
(2014) (on file with author) (giving officers one hour to secure representation).
139 See CoTY OF GAHANNA, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF GAHANNA AND FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE CAPITAL CITY LODGE No. 9, at 14 (2016) (on file
with author) (permitting a two-hour waiting period before an interrogation).
TERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE

140

See VILL.

OF HEMPSTEAD, VILLAGE OF HEMPSTEAD AND POLICE BENEVOLENT AssoCI-

8 (2011) (on file with author) (giving officers a mere one hour to secure representation).
141 See CITY OF TEMPE, TEMPE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 3-4 (2017), https://www.tempe.gov/home/showdocument?id=53211 [https://perma.cc/T9PFCRAC] (giving officers 30 minutes to confer with representation before an investigatory
interview).
142 See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
ATION OF HEMPSTEAD, NEW YORK, INC. CONTRACT

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF

POLICE, MPD LABOR COMMITrrEE 14 (2004) (on file with author) (generally giving officers a
two-hour waiting period, although allowing four hours in some cases).
143 See CITY OF WEST DES MOINES, CONTRACT: CITY OF WEST DES MOINES AND POLICE
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 238, at 10 (2013) (on file with author) (providing officers with a one-hour
waiting period).
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While it is relatively common for police union contracts to provide officers with rigid waiting periods before interrogations, it is important to recognize that the majority of contracts make no such
guarantee. Of course, police union contracts represent only one avenue by which officers have obtained protections. A number of LE145
144
OBRs provide similar protections, including Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, 146 and Nevada. 147 The waiting periods provided by these
state LEOBRs range anywhere from 48 hours to 30 days. 1" The majority of state LEOBRs provide officers with a less rigid waiting period, frequently guaranteeing a "reasonable" delay for an officer to
secure counsel or representation.149 Nevertheless, some of these LEOBRs establish procedural hurdles that may functionally result in
lengthy delays similar to or greater than the rigid waiting periods provided in other jurisdictions.- 0
B.

Evidence Before Interrogations

A slightly larger percentage of police departments in our dataset
have entered into union contracts or are bound by LEOBRs that require internal investigators to turn over potentially incriminating evidence to an officer before an interrogation. By far, the most common
types of evidence provided to officers before an interrogation are a
copy of a civilian complaint and the names of complainants. Around
28% of all jurisdictions in our dataset require officers to have access
to at least some of this information or evidence before investigators
144 See Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15.520(1)(c) (West 2010) (providing that "[n]o police officer
shall be subjected to interrogation in a departmental matter involving alleged misconduct on his
or her part, until forty-eight (48) hours have expired from the time the request for interrogation
is made to the accused officer, in writing").
145 See LA. STAT. ANr. § 40:2531(B)(4)(b)(i) (giving an officer up to 30 days to secure
representation).
146 See MD. CODE ANN., PuB. SAFETY § 3-104(j)(2)(i)-(ii) (LexisNexis 2011) (guaranteeing
up to five days to secure representation).
147 See NEv. ReV. STAT. ANN. § 289.060(1) (LexisNexis 2017) (generally providing a 48-

hour delay).
148 See supra notes 144-47.
149 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9200(c)(9) (2015) (delaying interviews "for a period of
time" so that an officer can obtain representation); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 725/3.9 (2017) (establishing that "no interrogation shall proceed until reasonable time and opportunity are provided
the officer to obtain counsel"); MINN. STAT. § 626.89, subd. 9 (also providing an officer with "a
reasonable opportunity" to obtain counsel); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.6-2(9) (2007) (similarly
mandating a delay for a reasonable period of time to obtain counsel).
150 See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 80F.1 (2018) (providing officers with a delay to have both a
union representative or a designate of their choice present, as well as an attorney, guaranteeing
the right to have the interview happen at an investigating agency facility, and providing no exceptions to these requirements like other LEOBRs).
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can commence a disciplinary interrogation. These protections frequently flow from police union contracts in cities of all sizes, including
Akron, Ohio, 151 Anchorage, Alaska, 152 Edmond, Oklahoma, 153 Elyria,
Ohio, 154 Fort Wayne, Indiana, 155 Houston, Texas, 156 Lake Oswego, Oregon, 157 Las Vegas, Nevada,'158 and Warren, Michigan, 5 9 just to name a
few.
A significantly smaller number of jurisdictions give officers access
to video and photographic evidence related to the alleged misconduct
(like body camera footage) or locational data (like GPS or AVL data).
151

See

Crrv OF AKRON, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF AKRON AND FRATERNAL

#7, at 9-10 (2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/odx-serb-input-content/
PDF/Contracts/2015/15-MED-10-1144.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9FC-ZE78] (giving officer access
to copy of complaint before interview).
152 See MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN
ORDER OF POLICE LODGE

ANCHORAGE

POLICE

DEPARTMENT

EMPLOYEES

ASSOCIATION

AND

MUNICIPALITY

OF

7-8 (2018), https://www.muni.org/Departments/employee-relations/Collective%20
bargaining%20agreements/APDEA%202018-2020%20Collective%2OBargaining%2OAgreemen
t.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST2E-G8P8] (providing in non-criminal investigations a copy of the complaint and the name of the complainant before interrogations).
153 See Crrv OF EDMOND, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF EDMOND AND THE FRATERNAL
ANCHORAGE

136, at 37 (2016) (on file with author) (giving officer copy of complaint and name of complainant before interrogation).
154 See CrrY OF ELYRIA, AN AGREEMENT By AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF ELYRIA, OHIO
AND THE ELYRIA POLICE PATROLMAN'S ASSOCIATION 30 (2016) (on file with author) (providing
officer in some cases with name of complainant and a copy of the complaint before an interrogation or interview).
155 See CITY OF FORT WAYNE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF FORT WAYNE, INDIORDER OF POLICE LOCAL

7 (2011) (on file
with author) (giving officers access to a signed statement and complaint explaining basis for any
allegation before questioning).
156 See CITY OF HOUSTON, MEET & CONFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE HOUSTON POLICE
ANA AND THE FORT WAYNE PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC.

OFFICERS' UNION AS THE MAJORITY BARGAINING AGENT FOR ALL POLICE OFFICERS AND THE

CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 39 (2015), http://www.houstontx.gov/hr/hrfiles/classified-testing/hpd.
meetconfer_2008_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QTT-7KYV] (giving officer access to statements
and complaints at time of 48-hour notification of an internal disciplinary interview).
157 See CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO AND
THE LAKE OSWEGO POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION (LOPOA) 46 (2016), https://www.ci.os
wego.or.us/sites/default/files/fileattachments/hr/webpage/11512/lopoa-cba-final-7.1.16_to_6.30.
19 ffs.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5UM-RJX5] (providing an officer with a signed and dated complaint from a complainant before any officer may be required to submit a written response).
158 See CITY OF LAS VEGAS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN LAS VEGAS
3
(2016), https://lvppa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/CBA-2016-2019-signed.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/L8KZ-NN9M] (allowing officers to have access to extensive access to evidence on file
with the police department investigators).
159 See CITY OF WARREN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF
WARREN AND WARREN POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 16 (2016) (on file with author) (giving
officers access to complaint before an interrogation).
METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTrvE ASSOCIATION
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These jurisdictions include Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 16° Green Bay,
162
Kansas City, Missouri, 163
Wisconsin,'161 Hobbs, New Mexico,
Phoenix, Arizona, 164 and a number of jurisdictions in Texas, including Austin, 165 Fort Worth, 166 Laredo,'1 67 Port Arthur, 168 San An170
tonio, 16 9 and San Marcos.
160

See CITY

OF FORT LAUDERDALE, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF FORT LAUDER-

DALE AND THE FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE LODGE 31, POLICE OFFICERS AND SERGEANTS, at 15

(2013) (on file with author) (giving officer access to "[t]he complaint, all witness statements,
including all other existing subject officer statements, and all other existing evidence, including,
but not limited to, incident reports, GPS locator information, and audio or video recordings
related to the incident under investigation").
161 See CITY OF GREEN BAY, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF GREEN BAY AND GREEN
BAY PROFESSIONAL POLICE ASSOCIATION 49 (2016) (on file with author) (giving officers access
to description and summary of all physical evidence against officer).
162 See CITY OF HOBBS, A RESOLUTION APPROVING A PROPOSED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT WITH THE HOBBS POLICE DEPARTMENT 11 (2015) (on file with author) (giving
officer access to "entire investigative file" for review purposes).
163 See CITY OF KANSAS CITY, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF
POLICE COMMISSIONERS

OF KANSAS

CITY, MISSOURI AND FRATERNAL

ORDER OF POLICE

LODGE No. 99, at 9 (2014), https://www.lris.com/wp-content/uploads/contracts/kansascity-mo-police.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9XA-ACKP] (giving officers access to video evidence and
police reports).
164 See CITY OF PHOENIX, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING: THE CITY OF PHOENIX
AND PHOENIX LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSOCIATION 12 (2016), https://azplea.com/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/MOU-2016-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/5428-GV6X] (stating that an officer gets
access during an interview to "any material that is being used as the basis for an allegation of
misconduct" including "video, audio, photographs, or documents").
165 See CrIY OF AUSTIN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF AUSTIN AND THE AUSTIN
POLICE ASSOCIATION 51 (2013), http://austinpolice.com/contract/2016/FINAL%20AGREE
MENT%20AS%20AMENDED.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QSA-C78U] (stating that an officer
"shall be provided an opportunity to review any videotape, photograph, or other recording of
the operative conduct or alleged injuries" before making a statement to an investigator).
166

See CITY

OF FORT WORTH, MEET AND CONFER LABOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF

FORT WORTH, TEXAS AND FORT WORTH POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 18 (2017), https://apps.

fortworthtexas.gov/councilpacket/renderffie.asp?filename=24652/MCA+2017%2D2020+Chan
ges+Made+2+with+Salary+Schedule%2Epdf [https://perma.cc/JA8Q-FNHM] (ensuring that
before an officer issues "a statement," he or she "will be allowed to review any dash cam or body
cam videos, and Taser readouts in the investigator's possession").
167

See CITY

OF LAREDO, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF

AND THE LAREDO POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION 52 (2016), http://
[https://perma.cc/BDP2-68PV]
www.cityoflaredohr.com/files/Police-Signed-Contractl6_20.pdf
(giving officers access to "complaints, GPS/AVL readouts, video recordings, audio recordings,
and photographs" related to the incident in question).
LAREDO,

168

TEXAS

See CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS

AND THE PORT ARTHUR POLICE ASSOCIATION 34 (2008) (on file with author) (giving officer

general right, with some exceptions, to inspect any material on file during an investigation).
169

See Crrv OF

SAN ANTONIO, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

81 (2016) (on file with author) (giving
officers access to a summary of the "general nature of the investigation," along with GPS/AVL
AND THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE OFFICERS' AssoCIATION
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Again, it is important to remember that police union contracts
are only one mechanism by which officers have been able to obtain
access to incriminating evidence before an interrogation. In a significant number of locales, the state LEOBR provides officers with a similar privilege. For example, the LEOBR in Florida gives officers prior
access to complaints, witness statements, and all existing evidence, including incident reports, GPS information, and audio or video recordings related to the incident.171 Other LEOBRs, like that in Iowa,
provide officers with a smaller amount of potentially incriminating information by only giving them access to "at a minimum" at least a
"summary of the complaint. ' ' 172 And a larger number of LEOBRs
merely require investigators to notify the officer of the "nature" of the
allegation-a requirement that appears to be substantially lower than
the requirement that investigators give officers details about a
1 73
complaint.
C. National Survey Results
While the data from the content analysis provides useful information on the commonality of various interrogation limitations, it fails to
answer the empirical question at the heart of this discussion: Do these
limitations on interrogation techniques impair the ability of investigators to uncover the truth or elicit incriminating statements? Respondents to our national survey of police leaders almost uniformly agree
that these interrogation regulations may limit the ability of investigators to elicit incriminating information or otherwise make it difficult
to uncover the truth. Table 3 summarizes the results of our national
survey of police leaders.
readouts, video recordings, audio recordings, photographs, written statements, complaints, and
affidavits).
170 See CITY OF SAN MARCOS, MEET AND CONFER AGREEMENT BETWEEN SAN MARCOS
POLICE OFFICERS' ASSOCIATION AND THE CITY OF SAN MARCOS, TExAS

29 (2015), https://
www.cleat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/San-Marcos-2015-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6Y84LXAE] (guaranteeing officers the ability to access complaints and other types of video or photographic evidence related to an allegation of misconduct).
171 FLA.STAT. ANN.§ 112.532(1)(d) (West 2014).
172 IOWA CODE § 80F.1(5) (2018).
173 See, e.g., CAL.GoV'T CODE § 3303(c) (West 2010) (giving officers right to know "nature
of the investigation" before an interrogation); 45 ILL COMP.STAT. § 725/3.2 (2016) (also giving
officers knowledge of nature of investigation before interrogation); MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 3-104(d)(2) (LexisNexis 2011) (similarly allowing officers to know nature of investigations prior to interrogation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-14-4(C)(2) (2013) (allowing officer to know
nature of investigation); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-28.6-2(5) (2007) (giving officers information on
"nature" of complaint); VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-501(2) (2018) (using same "nature of the investigation" language).
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POLICE LEADER OPINIONS ON INTERROGATION
LIMITATIONS

Effect on Investigations
Frequently Burden Investigation

Interrogation
Delays

Access to Evidence
Before Interrogation

91.0%
(142/156)

83.3%
(130/156)

Occasionally Burden Investigation

7.7%
(12/156)

14.1%
(22/156)

Rarely Burden Investigation

1.3%
(2/156)

2.6%
(4/156)

Never Burden Investigation

0.0%
(0/156)

0.0%
(0/156)

Over 98% of survey respondents claimed that interrogation delays would either frequently or occasionally burden investigations.

Similarly, 97% of survey respondents concluded that providing officers with evidence before an interrogation would either frequently

or occasionally burden an investigation. No respondents felt that these
kinds of procedural protections were costless-that is that they would

never burden an investigation. Additionally, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents (97%) agreed that these limitations on interrogations did not reduce the likelihood of false confessions.
The survey instrument also gave respondents an opportunity to
provide qualitative feedback. A number of respondents took this op-

portunity to elaborate on how these protections might affect investigations. Respondents worried that a 48-hour waiting period-the
median waiting period given to officers across police union contracts
and LEOBRs-provides suspects with a chance to "line up an alibi ,' 174 "construct lies and rehearse,"'175 "strategize about how to conceal the truth,' 1 76 "get their lies in order, ' 177 "destroy [or] hide
178 "tamper with witevidence not already in police possession,"'
80
1 79
nesses,"' or otherwise "give [a suspect] any advantage."' Multiple

respondents suggested that "[tihe first 48 hours of an investigation are
174 Survey Response from Police Chief #1 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author).
175 Survey Response from Police Chief #4 (July 16, 2018) [hereinafter Survey #4] (on file
with author).
176 Survey Response from Police Chief #30 (July 16, 2018) [hereinafter Survey #30] (on file
with author).
177 Survey Response from Police Chief #35 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author). This response was mirrored by a number of other respondents. See, e.g., Survey Response from Police
Chief #103 (July 24, 2018) (stating that giving suspects evidence or notification of an interrogation would "give [the] suspect time to formulate answers").
178 Survey Response from Police Chief #47 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author).
179

Id.

180 Survey Response from Police Chief #14 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author).
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critical," meaning that any significant delay "would contribute to
many more cold cases, as well as increas[e] man hours in solving a
case." 181 One respondent simply argued that, "the quicker you can get
a suspect[] [into the interrogation room], the better you are. ' 182 And
another respondent bluntly stated that a 48-hour waiting period
before an interrogation would only help suspects "get away with
something!"183
Respondents also expressed similar skepticism about any provision that allows suspects to access incriminating evidence against them
before an interrogation. One police chief compared this proposal to
"showing all of your cards in a poker game." 184 Another respondent
claimed that "[s]howing [suspects] evidence in advance allows them to
tailor their lies to fit the evidence," thereby reducing the "suspect's
uncertainty about the investigation. ' ' 185 A number of respondents argued that the purpose of an interrogation is to "determine if the suspect is being truthful. ' 186 Thus, providing a suspect with the evidence
in advance of an interrogation "would greatly limit this position," 187
and as one respondent put it, would give suspects "time to fabricate a
better lie." 188 And at least one respondent worried that this kind of a
provision may inadvertently publicize evidence, thereby calling into
question the "integrity of the investigation. ' 189
181 Survey Response from Police Chief #37 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author); see also
Survey Response from Police Chief #100 (July 24, 2018) [hereinafter Survey #100] (on file with
author) (stating that "[t]ime is often critical for investigations").
182 Survey Response from Police Chief #5 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author).
183 Survey Response from Police Chief #50 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author). For a similar response, see Survey Response from Police Chief #110 (July 24, 2018) (on file with author)
(suggesting that this proposal would not be a "service to all victims").
184 Survey Response from Police Chief #111 (July 24, 2018) (on file with author). Another
police chief made a similar comparison in detailed qualitative feedback. Survey Response from
Police Chief #124 (July 24, 2018) (on file with author) ("Giving suspects access to incriminating
evidence before an interrogation would be the same as playing poker with your cards laid out on
the table for all to see.").
185 Survey #4, supra note 175.
186 Survey Response from Police Chief #11 (July 16, 2018) [hereinafter Survey #11] (on file
with author); see also Survey #100, supra note 181.
187 Survey #11, supra note 186.
188 Survey Response from Police Chief #46 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author); see also
Survey #100, supra note 181 (stating that "withholding evidence before interrogation helps determine if [a] suspect has knowledge of [the] crime in question"); Survey Response from Police
Chief #104 (July 24, 2018) (stating that the "element of surprise and knowledge of the investigator's information is a tool used to provide the investigator with the ability to detect untruthfulness in a suspect['s] statement"); Survey Response from Police Chief #105 (July 24, 2018) (on file
with author) (expressing concern that this protection allows suspects to "pull a story together"
and to "cover the truth with a more comprehensive lie").
189 Survey #30, supra note 176.
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Other police chiefs offered mixed assessments in their qualitative
responses. For example, one police chief noted that "[e]ach investigator will have their own method." 190 Another police chief worried more
about the impact of these provisions on a suspect's willingness to "cooperate."'191 And a different police chief conceded that these protections may contribute to a greater sense of procedural justice among
suspects, which "could help elicit coordination" and thus "be of
value."192
Overall, though, the survey responses were remarkably consistent. As one chief bluntly put it, "[s]uch proposals would virtually nullify the need to interrogate ... suspects, as such proposals would make
it impossible for investigators to glean more information.' 1 93 Police
leaders from all parts of the country expressed widespread concern
that these protections would impair the ability of investigators to uncover the truth. And virtually no police chief felt that these protections were useful in reducing the rate of false confessions.
D.

Implications for Literature on Police Reform

These findings have important implications for the study of police
reform and criminal procedure. These findings reinforce the need for
continued scholarly discussion of how labor and employment law incidentally affect police reform efforts. 194 Policing scholars have written
extensively on the use of external legal mechanisms to reform the nation's police departments. An extensive body of scholarship has discussed the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule, 195 civil liability via 42
190 Survey Response from Police Chief #24 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author).
191 Survey Response from Police Chief #114 (July 24, 2018) (on file with author).
192 Survey Response from Police Chief #18 (July 16, 2018) (on file with author).
193 Survey Response from Police Chief #44 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author). These
statements roughly mirror some of the most impassioned responses we received in our qualitative data, such as one chief's statement that, "[t]hese are crazy!" and also that "[i]f our profession (lawmakers) go with [these proposals], good by [sic] America!!" Survey Response from
Police Chief #76 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author).
194 See generally Seth W. Stoughton, The Incidental Regulation of Policing, 98 MmwN. L.
REV. 2179 (2014) (discussing how various laws incidentally affect policing, including labor and
employment law).
195 The United States Supreme Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in 1914 in Weeks
v. United States, but limited its application to federal law enforcement agents. See 232 U.S. 383,
398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule but limiting its reach to apply only to illegally
obtained evidence by federal agency officials), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 643
(1961). Then, in 1961, in Mapp, the Court extended the exclusionary rule to state and local law
enforcement agents. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643, 655 (holding that the exclusionary rule applies to
"all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Federal Constitution" including by state and local law enforcement officials). In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, the
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U.S.C. § 1983,196 and criminal prosecution 97 in promoting constitutional policing. 198 The rationale behind these traditional policing regu-

lations is straightforward. If an officer commits an act of misconduct,
there are legal avenues to punish the officer or the police department.
By creating a risk of penalty, these laws should deter individual officers from engaging in misconduct. And at a more general level, the
possibility of sanctions should motivate a rational police department
to implement rigorous oversight and disciplinary systems to prevent
officer misconduct.
But for decades, scholars have worried that these external mecha-

nisms may be insufficient to bring about sustainable reform within police departments. So why have these mechanisms failed to achieve
their intended goals? Scholars have offered a wide range of answers.

Some scholars have pointed out the various exceptions and loopholes
under existing law. For example, the exclusionary rule is riddled with

exceptions that prevent its application in cases of clear officer misconCourt further expanded the exclusionary rule to apply to copies of illegally obtained evidence as
well as original forms of evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution. See 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920). The Court, in Elkins v. United States, explained that the
purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "deter" law enforcement officials from obtaining evidence
that violates an individual's Constitutional rights and "to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it." 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
196 This is the primary way that victims of police misconduct can bring a civil suit against a
police officer and/or a police department in federal court when a police officer deprives an individual of their constitutional rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) ("Every person who, under color
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding .... ").
197 The federal government can prosecute police officers suspected of misconduct under 18
U.S.C. § 242, which provides that "[w]hoever, under color of any law... willfully subjects any
person in any State ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined . . . or impris-

oned .... " 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012).
198 This list does not include the use of federal consent decrees in bringing about police
reform. Congress provided the power to the Department of Justice to bring structural reform
litigation against police departments engaged in the practice of unconstitutional misconduct
under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (recodified at 34 U.S.C. § 12601). Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210401, 108 Stat. 1796, 2071. For more information
on the application of this statute, see generally Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police
Reform, 82 FORDHAM L. REv. 3189 (2014) (evaluating how the Department of Justice has enforced § 14141 over time); Kami Chavis Simmons, The Politicsof Policing: Ensuring Stakeholder
Collaboration in the Federal Reform of Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 98 J. CRIn. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2008) (discussing how the Department of Justice could reform its approach
to overhauling local police departments to ensure greater community involvement).
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duct. 199 Various commentators have observed that legal barriers make
it difficult for these external mechanisms to be used regularly in re-

sponse to officer misconduct. For example, the qualified immunity
doctrine protects officers against some civil suits under § 1983200 and
litigants must often make a relatively difficult factual showing in order
to hold a police department responsible for the conduct of its of-

ficers.20 1 Some have noted that these mechanisms

are under-

enforced.2 02 A few scholars have demonstrated that these mechanisms
199 See, e.g., James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 309 (1990) (limited the impeachment exception
solely to the testimony of the criminal defendant, not any other defense witness); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445-48 (1984) (establishing the inevitable discovery exception, which allows
illegally obtained evidence that would have been inevitably discovered through legal avenues to
be admissible); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (establishing the independent source exception, which inquires whether the evidence was obtained through a violation of
an individual's Fourth Amendment right or through an independent source); Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (establishing the impeachment exception, which allows the government to impeach a defendant who perjures himself on direct examination during cross examination with illegally obtained evidence). For more information on exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, see generally Heather A. Jackson, Arizona v. Evans: Expanding Exclusionary Rule Exceptions and Contracting Fourth Amendment Protection, 86 J. CRnI.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1201,
1204-10 (1996). Another reason the exclusionary rule lacks effectiveness to prevent and solve
police misconduct is because of the high number of guilty pleas in the U.S. criminal justice system compared to convictions from criminal trials. See Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox,97
Nw. U. L. REV. 801, 831-33 (2003).
200 See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) ("Qualified immunity shields federal
and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official
violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was 'clearly established' at the
time of the challenged conduct." (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))); Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (establishing the "clearly established" law standard for qualified immunity cases); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223 (1988) (explaining that "[w]hen officials are threatened with personal liability... they may ... be induced to act with an excess of
caution ... in ways that result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria
that ought to guide their conduct").
201 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 379 (1989) (the Court found that the "inade-

quacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train
in a relevant respect amounts to deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact"); Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01
(1978) (holding that a police department or municipality can be held liable for the actions of a
police officer who violates a civil claimant's constitutional rights under § 1983).
202 Take, for example, the lack of criminal prosecutions against police officers involved in
uses of deadly force, even against unarmed suspects. First, a number of scholars have discussed
the conflicts of interest inherent in a prosecutor investigating and bringing charges against a
police officer. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 41, at 803-04 (explaining the conflicts of interest
within police departments that may lead to choices not to prosecute officers); see also Kate
Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. RaV. 1447, 1447 (2016) (observing the
conflicts of interest that prosecutors generally have when bringing charges against police officers); Kate Levine, How We Prosecutethe Police, 104 GEo. L.J. 745, 745 (2016) (observing how
often prosecutors engage in thorough precharge investigations of police officers and present
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury, and arguing that such a procedure ought to extend to all
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operate on faulty assumptions about who pays for officer misconduct
and how departments internalize these costs. 20 3 And still others have

shown that, often because of the structure of local government, police
departments may not respond rationally (at least in an economic
sense) by implementing reforms in response to increased external

costs. 20

4

An emerging body of literature, though, is beginning to demonstrate how labor and employment law protections may also complicate
police reform. Several scholars and commentators have recently argued that labor and employment laws can prevent supervisors from
adequately investigating and punishing officers accused of misconduct. 205 The findings from this Article build on this emerging literature. They suggest that, even when police leaders have strong external
legal incentives to combat unconstitutional police behavior, labor protections may impede their ability to investigate officer misconduct and
take necessary disciplinary action. More generally, these findings
should encourage future scholars to focus more attention on how internal departmental policies and procedures may impair police accountability efforts.

suspects). Second, others have argued that juries are less likely to convict a police officer than a
similarly situated civilian. See, e.g., Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781,
783 (1979) ("[J]uries . . . are not impartial because many jurors disfavor plaintiffs and favor
police defendants in these suits[,] and ... adverse verdicts have minimal effect on defendants
because police departments and police officers are insulated from the consequences of the
suits."). Finally, emerging evidence suggests that police officers rarely face charges after deadly
use of force. See, e.g., Madison Park, Police Shootings: Trials, Convictions Are Rare for Officers,
CNN (updated Oct. 3, 2018, 4:41 PM), https://www.cnn.comI2Ol7/05/18/us/police-involved-shooting-cases/index.html [https://perma.cc/QHK9-DYAY].
203 See, e.g., John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARv. L.
REV. 1539, 1540 (2017) (describing how the market for liability insurance affects police reform);
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification,89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 912 (2014) ("Officers financially contributed to settlements or judgments in approximately .41% of those cases" between
2006 and 2011 in approximately 9,225 civil rights cases).
204 See Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State "Pattern or Practice" Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. Crv. RTS. L.J. 479, 495
(2009) ("Essentially, one agency of government, the police department, commits abuses of
rights, another agency, the city attorney's office, defends the conduct in court, and a third
agency, the city treasurer, pays whatever financial settlement results from the litigation. Missing
from this scenario is an overarching sense of responsibility on the part of any agent or agency of
local government, presumably the mayor or city council, which would pursue improvements in
the police department as a means of reducing the costs of litigation.").
205 See supra Part II.
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REFORMING POLICE INTERROGATION PROCEDURES

The data from this Article suggests that police union contracts

and LEOBRs have insulated many police officers in the United States
from accountability by preventing investigators from using effective
interrogation techniques against them during internal disciplinary investigations. Nearly a quarter of all police departments in our dataset
provide police officers with lengthy delays before interrogations, and
an even larger number of agencies give officers access to some or all
incriminating evidence against them in advance of interrogations.
Data from our national survey shows that police leaders widely be-

lieve that these interrogation regulations substantially burden investigations or otherwise prevent investigators from eliciting incriminating
information. Virtually no police leaders believe that these limitations
are useful in reducing false confessions.
Municipalities should develop officer interview procedures that
carefully balance the need for due process with the need for legitimate
investigations of suspected misconduct. Unfortunately, it appears that
many police departments are not striking such a careful balance. Too
often municipalities give officers overly generous protections from interrogations that limit accountability. By drawing on the data
presented in this Article, as well as leading interrogation manuals,2°6
206 Specifically, we consider interrogation training material sold commercially by John E.
Reid & Associates, one of the largest providers in the United States of training in interrogation
techniques for law enforcement officials. See generally TrainingPrograms,JoHN E. REiD & Assocs., INC., http://www.reid.com/training-programs/r-training.html [https://perma.cc/YP8Y3FXK]. According to the website, the company has had "[miore than 500,000 professionals in
the law enforcement and security fields" attend their interrogation training programs since 1974.
Id. Reid and Associates offer a wide range of interrogation training materials to law enforcement. Additionally, their website contains testimonials from law enforcement officers across the
United States, who have attended one of the training programs on their website. For example,
their website quotes Mack Rayburn of the Kentucky State Police as saying, "I have been using
the Reid Technique since the training. I have been very successful using this technique. I got a
confession two days after the training. I also got a confession from a 'long-time' sexual offender.
He had been investigated many times over a 20-year period-with no one obtaining a confession
until I used the Reid Technique on him." General Comments, JoHN E. REiD & Assocs., INC.,
https://www.reid.com/success_reid/r-comments.html. The website quotes Sergeant J. Richard
Ward of the Charlottesville, Virginia Police Department as saying, "As a training coordinator I
see a big difference in the cases solved by those that have attended the Reid seminar. We send
every investigator to your classes." Id. There are several more testimonials from law enforcement officials who have used the Reid method of interrogation on the website. Id&Further,
"[t]he Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services has approved the following Reid programs: '3-day seminar on The Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation[,] Approved for
18 hrs,' '3-day seminar on The Reid Technique of Investigative Interviewing for Child Abuse
Investigations[,] Approved for 18hrs' [and the] 'l-day seminar on The Advanced course on The
Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation[,] Approved for 6hrs."' POST, JoHN E. REiD
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we have four recommendations for how state and local legislators
should regulate interrogations of police officers in the future.
A.

Recognizing Humane Limitations on Officer Interrogations

To begin with, police departments should provide officers with
reasonable protections against unduly coercive or abusive interroga-

tions. These protections ought to include: (1) bans on abusive language and excessively long interrogations, (2) requirements that
officers have reasonable access to food and water during long interro-

gations (3) guarantees that, except in exigent circumstances, investigators will conduct interrogations during work hours, and (4) a
reasonable opportunity for officers to obtain legal counsel or union
representation, particularly in cases of custodial interrogation.
A large number of communities adopt these sorts of basic

prohibitions against unreasonably coercive or harmful techniques during officer interrogations. For example, communities like Honolulu,

Hawaii,2 7 San Diego, California,2 0 8 and Wichita, Kansas, 20 9 provide
& Assocs., INC., https://www.reid.com/educational-info/r.-post.html?serial=37 [https://perma.cc/
3DQT-F4ZQ]. In addition, we also consider three other interrogation manuals. See JOHN M.
MACDONALD & DAVID L. MicHAUD, THE CONFESSION: INTERROGATION AND CRIMINAL
PROFILES FOR POLICE OFFICERS (1987); CHARLES E. O'HARA & GREGORY L. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (7th ed. 2003); ROBERT F. ROYAL & STEVEN SCHUTTI,
THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION: A PROFESSIONAL MANUAL AND

GUIDE (1976). A number of states recommend or require that officers utilize this interrogation
training material. Specifically, there are state-level authorities in more than 21 states, including
Arizona, Maryland, Michigan, and North Carolina, who have approved one or more of Reid &
Associates' interrogation trainings for its law enforcement officials, according to the POST section of their website. POST, JoHN E. REID & Assocs., INC., supra.
207 See STATE OF HAWAII, AGREEMENT BETWEEN STATE OF HAWAII, CITY & COUNTY OF
HONOLULU, COUNTY OF HAWAII, COUNTY OF MAUI, COUNTY OF KAUAI AND STATE OF HAWAII

ORGANIZATION OF POLICE OFFICERS BARGAINING UNIT 12, at 21 (2011), https://
staticl.squarespace.cm/static/559fbf2be4b8ef197467542/t/5679f3dd7086d7e97534ae1c/
1450832861111/Honolulu+Police+Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GCR-KW4J] (giving officers
access to personal necessities and limiting inhumane abuses during interrogation).
208

OF SAN

See CITY

OF SAN DIEGO, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BY AND BETWEEN CITY

DIEGO AND SAN DIEGO POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 49 (2015), https://
www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/humanresources/pdf/fyl6poamou.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/H7D8-BW9H] (ensuring officers can tend to personal necessities like bathroom use
and providing the kind of limits described in this Part).
209 See CITY OF WICHITA, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF
WICHITA, KANSAS AND FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #5, WICHITA, KANSAS, INC. 38
(2017), http://www.wichita.gov/HR/HRDocuments/2017-2018 %20FOP%20Contract%20%20EFF%2012.16.2017%20thru%2012.15.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/3X7X-7S7H] (stating that
"the interview shall be completed as soon as possible. Time may be provided for personal necessities, meals, telephone calls, and rest periods, as appropriate" and further explaining that "[n]o
offensive language, coercion or promise of reward as an inducement to answering questions shall
be directed at the employee").
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such reasonable and humane limitations. Through our review of leading interrogation manuals, we have been unable to locate any persuasive evidence that interrogators need to utilize tactics that violate
these principles in order to uncover the truth. There is also compelling
empirical research to suggest that these tactics may contribute to false
confessions or the elicitation of unreliable information. 210 This may be
part of the reason that leading interrogation manuals urge officers not
to use many of these tactics, for fear that they may elicit false
confessions.

21 1

Outside of their likely ineffectiveness in eliciting incriminating information, coercive tactics that violate these norms may have harmful
downstream consequences on a workplace. Employees may understandably view such tactics as procedurally unjust. And such inhumane tactics may also irreparably harm the relationship between
employees and an employer. Thus, we believe explicitly memorializing
these kinds of procedural protections "respect the officer as an individual and as an employee, aid in the search for truth, and pose no
barrier to accountability. ' 2 12 While some civil rights advocates have
taken issue with these sorts of protections, we are of the belief that
these protections should be extended to both civilians and police of213
ficers facing any kind of custodial interrogation or interview.

210 For example, recent empirical studies identified that police conducting lengthy interrogations on civilians is one of the interrogation practices that are "most likely to precipitate untrustworthy confessions." Welsh S.White, What is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RurGERS
L. Rnv. 2001, 2042-43 (1998) (pointing to a study by Leo and Ofshe of "sixty known and probable false confession cases" that identified conducting lengthy interrogations as one of the two
interrogation tactics that was used most often in the sixty-case sample that played a "major part"
in civilian suspects providing "untrustworthy confessions"); see also Richard A. Leo & Richard
J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of
Justice in the Age of PsychologicalInterrogation,88 J. CRM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998). One
empirical study conducted by Leo and Ofshe provides ample data support for the "conclusion
that lengthy interrogations are likely to cause untrustworthy confessions." White, supra,at 2046.
Leo and Ofshe's study highlighted how one suspect was interrogated for over nine hours continuously by police officers. Id. at 2046-47. Admittedly, there is no set length of an interrogation
that will automatically produce an involuntary confession under the Constitution. But again, this
does not change our opinion that such tactics are normatively undesirable for all suspects.
211 See INBAU ET AL., supra note 12, at xi (warning officers against "use of force, threats of

force, or promises of leniency," because they may contribute to false confessions).
212 Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 218.
213 See generally Levine & Rushin, supra note 52 (arguing for the extension of some equal
protections to both police officers and civilians undergoing custodial interrogations).
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B. Differentiating Between Criminal and Administrative
Investigations

Additionally, states and localities should provide officers with different levels of procedural protections during interrogations depending on the seriousness of the alleged misconduct. Specifically,
policymakers would be wise to distinguish between investigations of
criminal conduct and investigations of mere disciplinary violations.
When the stakes are relatively low, it may be unwise as a policy matter
for an employer to use coercive interrogation techniques to elicit information from an employee.
But when the stakes are particularly high-as in cases where a
department believes that an officer has used deadly force against a
civilian unlawfully-departments should have more latitude to treat
officers in a manner consistent with criminal suspects. Several communities make such an explicit distinction in regulating disciplinary interrogations, including Albuquerque, New Mexico, 214 Fairbanks,
Alaska,

15

Memphis, Tennessee,2

16

and Minneapolis, Minnesota.2 17

For example, Fairbanks has a contractual term that explicitly provides that if a member of the union is subject to a criminal investigation "this Department shall not afford him/her any greater or lesser
rights than are enjoyed by other citizens of this City and State when
subject to criminal investigations or proceedings. ' 218 Not all collective
bargaining agreements or LEOBRs make such a clear delineation.
This may result in police officers under criminal investigation receiv214 See CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, supra note 135, at 30 (describing how the procedural approach should differ if "a member is under arrest or is likely to be; that is, if he/she is a suspect or
the target of a criminal investigation").
215 See THE CITY OF FAIRBANKS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
CITY OF FAIRBANKS AND THE PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, FARBANKS POLICE

DEPARTMENT CHAPTER 17 (2011), http://www.psea.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2011-CityPSEA-CBA-agreement-04-03-12-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/T5N4-4Y4J] (describing the lesser protections afforded to an officer facing criminal investigations).
216 See CITY OF MEMPHIS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE MEMPHIS POLICE ASSOCIATION

AND TE CITY OF MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE 16 (2011), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/
559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/56771372cbced60a23745ad4/1450644338865/Memphis+Police+Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3QW-BYZF] (distinguishing between procedures for internal investigations and criminal investigations).
217

CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS, Tim CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS AND THE POLICE OFFICERS' FEDER-

OF MINNEAPOLIS: LABOR AGREEMENT, POLICE UNIT 12-13 (2017), http://
www.minneapolismn.gov/www/groups/public/@hr/documents/webcontent/wcmsp-200131.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VT'7W-9AVN] (explaining how, while usual summary reports are given to officers before internal interviews, this requirement can be waived if it would endanger a criminal
investigation).
218 See CITY OF FAIRBANKS, supra note 215, at 17.
ATION
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ing heightened protections above and beyond those given to civilians
under criminal investigation.
C.

Limiting Rigid Delay Provisions

Next, states and localities should only provide officers with a reasonable period of time to secure counsel or representation before an
internal investigatory interview. As we discussed in more detail in Part
III, there may be situations when police departments need to delay
interrogations for various legal and policy reasons. Officers, like any
other person, are constitutionally entitled to legal representation if
subject to a custodial interrogation in which investigators attempt to
219
elicit incriminating information that could lead to criminal charges.
Additionally, as part of an internal investigation, police departments
will frequently compel officers to answer questions. Failure to answer
these questions may result in disciplinary action or termination.
Under such circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that police may not use such compelled answers as evidence against an officer
220
in future criminal proceedings.
Thus, because police misconduct may frequently overlap with
criminal conduct, it seems prudent and necessary as a legal matter for
police departments to give officers a reasonable amount of time to
secure representation before an investigatory interview. However, our
data suggests that many police union contracts and LEOBRs do more
than provide officers with a reasonable period of time to secure representation. Many guarantee officers a rigid and lengthy delay before
interrogations, regardless of the circumstances. To use the language of
previous scholars, these types of waiting periods are "intolerable," because they may "allow officers time to collude to create a consistent,
'221
exculpatory story."
As several police leaders noted in their qualitative answers to our
'222
survey, a rigid waiting period gives suspects "time to fabricate a lie."
Some respondents worried that these kinds of delays can "severly [sic]
hinder the ability [of investigators] to determine a suspects [sic] credibility and truthfulness. '223 Others worried that "[g]iving advanced notice would potentially allow suspects to change stories or get with
219
220
221
222

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1967).
Keenan & Walker, supra note 48, at 212.
Survey Response from Police Chief #48 (July 18, 2018) [hereinafter Survey #48] (on file

with author).
223

Survey Response from Police Chief #55 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author).
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others to match stories. 2 24 This criticism seems especially salient
when investigating allegations of police misconduct, particularly cases
involving multiple officers. In these cases, federal consent decrees in
cities like Los Angeles, 225 Seattle, 226 New Orleans,2 27 and Albuquerque2 28 have explicitly required investigators to report to the scene of
serious use of force incidents as soon as possible to interview all individuals involved separately, so as to prevent officers from "conspiring
'22 9
to create a story that exonerates any and all officers of misconduct.
By giving officers 48 hours or more of advanced notification of a
planned interrogation, some police departments effectively prevent
investigators from using such tactics against police suspects. These jurisdictions give officers ample opportunity to coordinate stories.
Rather than offering lengthy and rigid interrogation delays, states
and localities should look to the example of language from the union
contracts in most American cities like Hialeah, Florida, 230 Green Bay,
Wisconsin,2 31 and New Haven, Connecticut, 232 or the LEOBRs in Cali224

Survey Response from Police Chief #61 (July 18, 2018) (on file with author).

225 Consent Decree at 23-25, United States v. City of Los Angeles, No. 00-cv-11769 (C.D.
Cal., June 15, 2001), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0006.pdf [https://
perma.cc/KZT5-TEFN] (requiring supervisors to report to the scene of serious uses of force and
immediately separate officers before taking statements).
226 See Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution at 25-28,
United States v. City of Seattle, No. 12-cv-01282 (W.D. Wash., July 27, 2012), http://
[https://perma.cc/
www.justice.gov/crt/about/splldocuments/spd-consentdecree_7-27-12.pdf
ZA2S-Y3JQ] (requiring supervisors to report to the scene after an officer use-of-force situation
that results in injury and separately interview officers as soon as feasible).
227 See Consent Decree at 25-26, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-cv-01924
(E.D. La., July 24, 2012), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-LA-0001-0001.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D8WB-XLR9] (requiring supervisors to arrive on scene, separate officers, and
take statements after certain use-of-force incidents).
228 See Settlement Agreement at 22-25, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv1025 (D.N.M., Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/19/
apdsettlement_11-14-14.pdf [https://perma.ec/6VH8-PK47] (requiring supervisors to separate
officers at scene of use-of-force incident to take contemporaneous statements).
229 Walker, supra note 73, at 3.
230 See CITY OF HIALEAH, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF HIALEAH, FLORIDA AND DADE
COUNTY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION 30 (2013), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/
559fbf2be4b08ef197467542/t/567639f6e0327c06bccfca10/1450588662114fHialeah+Police+Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML65-XVZT] (providing officers with opportunity to secure representation, but not articulating a rigid waiting period to allow this to happen).
231 See Crrv OF GREEN BAY, supra note 161, at 49 (giving officer opportunity to secure
representation, but not providing for a strict waiting period).
232 See CITY OF NEW HAVEN, AGREEMENT BETWEEN T1HE CITY OF NEW HAVEN AND THE
NEW HAVEN POLICE UNION, LODGE 530, AND COUNCIL 15, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 63 (2011) (on
file with author) (providing officer chance to secure representation without giving a rigid waiting
period).
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fornia, 233 Delaware, 234 Florida, 235 Iowa, 236 and Wisconsin, 237 which

merely grant officers a reasonable or limited period of time to obtain
representation before investigators may begin interrogations.
D.

Limiting the Amount of Evidence Given to Officers in Advance
of Interrogations

Finally, police departments should limit officers' access to evidence in advance of an investigatory interview into serious misconduct-particularly evidence that may give officers an opportunity to
construct a false story and avoid responsibility. In this way, providing
officers with access to civilian complaints, witness names, video evidence, photographic evidence, and locational evidence may significantly hamper the ability of internal investigators to elicit
incriminating statements. In our judgment, giving officers a general
summary of the purpose of an interview should be sufficient to reasonably apprise them of the purpose of a compelled interview. A large
number of communities have reached a similar conclusion, including
24 °
23 9
Columbus, Ohio, 238 Indianapolis, Indiana, and Omaha, Nebraska.
233 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3303(i) (West 2010) ("Upon the filing of a formal written statement of charges, or whenever an interrogation focuses on matters that are likely to result in
punitive action against any public safety officer, that officer, at his or her request, shall have the
right to be represented by a representative of his or her choice who may be present at all times
during the interrogation.").
234

DEL. CODE ANN.

tit. 11, § 9200(c)(9) (2015) ("Upon request, any officer under ques-

tioning shall have the right to be represented by counsel or other representative of the officer's
choice, who shall be present at all times during the questioning unless waived in writing by the
investigated officer. The questioning shall be suspended for a period of time if the officer requests representation until such time as the officer can obtain the representative requested if
reasonably available.").
235 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.532(1)(i) (West 2014) ("At the request of any law enforcement
officer or correctional officer under investigation, he or she has the right to be represented by
counsel or any other representative of his or her choice, who shall be present at all times during
the interrogation whenever the interrogation relates to the officer's continued fitness for law
enforcement or correctional service.").
236 IOWA CODE § 80F.1(8) (2018) ("The officer shall have the right to have legal counsel
present, at the officer's expense, during the interview of the officer.").
237

Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 164.02(1)(b) (West 2016) ("At the request of any law enforcement

officer under interrogation, he or she may be represented by a representative of his or her choice
who, at the discretion of the officer, may be present at all times during the interrogation.").
238 See CITY OF COLUMBUS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN CITY OF COLUMBUS ANDFRATERNAL
POLICE, CAPITAL CITY LODGE No. 9, at 16 (2014), https://s3.amazonaws.com/odx[https://perma.cc/XPR6-VP6S]
serb-input-content/PDF/Contracts/2014/14-MED-08-1031.pdf
("The member being investigated shall be given a copy of any citizen complaint or a written
summary of the allegations and any known basic facts of the incident of any non-citizen complaint prior to any questioning.").
239 See CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS AND
ORDER OF

THE FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE #86,

at 10 (2014) (on file with author) (explaining
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This distinction is grounded in the best available evidence from
leading interrogation manuals, 241 as well as common sense. By giving
officers access to incriminating evidence before an interrogation,
many departments give officers ample opportunity to construct a
fabricated story and deflect responsibility. Such generous provisions
may also impede one of the most common interrogation techniques
used by law enforcement across the country. As one leading interrogation manual explains, investigators can use the presence of incriminating evidence to their advantage during an interrogation-particularly
if investigators do not allow a suspect to know about the discovery of
the evidence. 242 To do this, one manual states that investigators should
"avoid mentioning specific evidence against the suspect or contradictions in the suspect's earlier statement during the initial contact" with
a suspect. 243 Instead, the manual recommends that officers remind suspects at the beginning of an interrogation that "there are independent
means to detect any lies told," including the presence of physical evidence recovered as part of the investigation. 244 Thereafter, investigators can use their knowledge of existing physical evidence to "[t]rap[]
the [s]ubject in a [1]ie. ' 245 This is "where the investigator knows what a
truthful answer should be to a certain question, but [the investigator]
'246
asks it in a manner that implies a lack of knowledge.
As an example, the manual describes a situation where an officer
knows that a robbery suspect made a substantial payment on a personal loan or deposited a large sum of money into the bank under a
fictitious name. Rather than directly confronting the suspect with this
evidence, the manual recommends that the officer ask the suspect the
following question: "Except for your salary (or other usual income)
have you come into possession of any other money recently? ' 247 If the
suspect "readily admits he has, and offers a satisfactory explanation of
it, such a disclosure may serve to exonerate him from further suspithat in some cases, officers will receive an oral summary of the allegation before an
interrogation).
240 See Crr OF OMAHA, AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE CITY OF OFOMAHA, NEBRASKA AND
THE OMAHA POLICE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION 12-13 (2014) (on file with author) (stating that an
officer should receive notice of the nature of the investigation in advance of an interview).
241 See supra note 206 (summarizing some of the interrogation manual material considered
by this Article).
242 See INBAU ET
243 Id. at 75.
244 Id. at 79.
245 Id. at 178.
246 Id.
247 Id. at 178-79.

AL.,

supra note 12, at 171-75.
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'248

But if the suspect lies, this may be a "strong indication of
possible guilt. '249 And once an investigator has caught a suspect in a
lie, the manual claims that the "subject will have considerable diffi-

cion.

culty avoiding telling the rest of the truth." 250

But by giving officers extensive access to incriminating evidence
against them, many police union contracts and some LEOBRs effectively eliminate (or sharply curtail) the ability of officers to utilize
these techniques. 251 Survey respondents reiterated this fact in their
qualitative responses. As one chief put it, providing suspects with access to evidence before an interrogation would make it difficult for
investigations to "determine truth of statements" or "check to see if
'252
timelines are correct.
CONCLUSION

Police officers deserve adequate procedural protections during internal investigations. These include reasonable regulations to protect
the dignity and constitutional rights of officers. Nevertheless, these
protections should not become so burdensome that they impair the
ability of investigators to conduct thorough investigations. As is often
the case in regulating police officers, it can be difficult to strike a reasonable balance.
Even so, it is impossible to ignore the obvious asymmetry between the limited procedural protections given to civilians during custodial interrogations and the generous protections afforded to officers
facing similar interrogations. Civilian interrogations are designed to
be psychologically coercive. Investigators often lie, mislead, trick, and
even discuss nonexistent evidence with civilian suspects. 25 3 By contrast, many police union contracts and police officer bills of rights ban
some or all of these same tactics when officers face interrogations
about alleged misconduct. As this Article demonstrates, a substantial
number of police departments provide officers with rigid waiting periId. at 179.
Id.
250 Id.
251 This Article takes no position on all forms of deception during interrogations. Some
contracts attempt to limit any form of deception by law enforcement. For example, some contracts, like those in Phoenix, go as far as explicitly stating that investigators may not "knowingly
misrepresent any fact or material issue to the unit member." See Crrv OF PHOENIX, supra note
164, at 12. While this may be overly broad and prevent legitimate investigative techniques, we
take no position on the general topic of deception in interrogations.
252 Survey #48, supra note 222.
253 See supra Section I.A.
248
249
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ods before an interrogation. And many others give officers access to

some or all incriminating evidence against them before questioning.
Respondents to our national survey widely believe that these restric-

tions impair legitimate investigations. These kinds of provisions stack
the deck in favor of police officers and may make it difficult to un-

cover the truth.
Changing these internal policies will be an uphill battle. It will
require communities to renegotiate collective bargaining agreements
and state legislators to make substantial amendments to LEOBRs.

Given the political strength of police unions,254 this may seem impossible. But recent progress suggests otherwise. Over the last few years,
activists have pushed lawmakers in states like Maryland and Louisiana

to make modest alterations to their LEOBRs. 5 5 Similarly, activists in
cities like Austin 256 and Chicago

57

have demanded the renegotiation

of police union contracts. These represent important and necessary
reforms to ensure that police officers remain accountable to the communities they serve.

254 Fisk & Richardson, supra note 67, at 744-47 (describing police unions and the political
process).
255 See, e.g., Ovetta Wiggins, After Baltimore Riots, Changes to Police 'Bill of Rights'
Sought, WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/policereform-advocates-call-on-md-lawmakers-to-address-officer-misconduct/2015/08/24/e2775c884a67-11e5-846d-02792f854297_story.html [https://perma.cc/ST8R-URXF] (describing the push
for reform to the Maryland LEOBR after the Freddie Gray riots).
256 See Mark Wilson, Austin Police Union Ready to Re-Enter ContractNegotiations, AUSTIN
AMERICAN-STATESMAN
(last updated Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.statesman.com/NEWS/
20180130/Austin-police-union-ready-to-re-enter-contract-negotiations
[https://perma.cc/7SXQUANH] (describing how activists have demanded changes to the union contract because it does
not "provide enough oversight and accountability for officers").
257 See Tonya Francisco, Police Union Contract Talks Continue, as do Calls from [sic] More
Civilian Oversight, WGN9 (last updated May 22, 2018), https://wgntv.com/2018/05/21/policeunion-contract-talks-continue-as-do-cals-from-more-civilian-oversight [https://perma.cc/PV28W7K6] (quoting grassroots organizer who argues that the Chicago contract gives officers more
protection than that afforded to civilians and demands changes).
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A: AGENCIES STUDIED
City

State

Colton

CA

Concord

CA

Corona

CA

Costa Mesa

CA

Culver City

CA

Cypress

CA

Daly City

CA

Davis

CA

Delano

CA

Downey

CA

El Cajon

CA

El Monte

CA

Elk Grove

CA

Escondido

CA

Fairfield

CA

Folsom

CA

Fontana

CA

Fountain Valley

CA

Fremont

CA

Fresno

CA

Fullerton

CA

Garden Grove

CA

Gardena

CA

Gilroy

CA

Glendale

CA

Glendora

CA

Hanford

CA

Hawthorne

CA

Hayward

CA

Hemet

CA

CA

Huntington Beach

CA

Citrus Heights

CA

Huntington Park

CA

Clovis

CA

Indio

CA

City
Anchorage

State
AK

Fairbanks
Juneau
Little Rock
Chandler
Glendale
Goodyear
Lake Havasu City

AK
AK
AR
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ

Mesa
Peoria
Phoenix
Tempe
Tucson
Alameda
Anaheim
Antioch
Arcadia
Azusa
Bakersfield
Baldwin Park

AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
AZ
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

Berkeley
Brea
Brentwood
Buena Park
Burbank
Carlsbad
Cathedral City
Ceres
Chico
Chino

CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

Chula Vista
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City
Inglewood
Irvine
La Habra
La Mesa
Lincoln
Livermore
Lodi
Long Beach
Los Angeles
Madera
Manhattan Beach
Manteca
Menlo Park
Merced
Milpitas
Modesto
Monterey Park
Mountain View
Murrieta
Napa
National City
Newport Beach
Novato
Oakland
Oceanside
Ontario
Orange
Oxnard
Palm Springs
Palo Alto
Pasadena
Petaluma
Pittsburg
Placentia
Pleasanton

State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA

city
Pomona
Redding
Redlands
Redondo Beach
Redwood City
Rialto
Richmond
Riverside
Rocklin
Roseville
Sacramento
Salinas
San Bernardino
San Diego
San Francisco
San Jos6
San Leandro
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
San Rafael
San Ramon
Santa Ana
Santa Barbara
Santa Clara
Santa Cruz
Santa Maria
Santa Monica
Santa Rosa
Simi Valley
South Gate
South San Francisco
Stockton
Sunnyvale
Torrance
Tracy

State
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
CA
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City

State

city

State

Tulare

CA

New Haven

CT

Turlock

CA

Norwalk

CT

Tustin

CA

Norwich

CT

Union City

CA

Stamford

CT

Upland

CA

Stratford

CT

Vacaville

CA

Torrington

CT

Vallejo

CA

Waterbury

CT

Ventura

CA

West Hartford

CT

Visalia

CA

District of Columbia

DC

Walnut Creek

CA

Dover

DE

Watsonville

CA

Newark

DE

West Covina

CA

Wilmington

DE

West Sacramento

CA

Aventura

FL

Westminster

CA

Boca Raton

FL

Whittier

CA

Boynton Beach

FL

Woodland

CA

Bradenton

FL

Yuba City

CA

Cape Coral

FL

Aurora

CO

Clearwater

FL

Boulder

CO

Coconut Creek

FL

Commerce City

CO

Coral Gables

FL

Denver

CO

Coral Springs

FL

Fort Collins

CO

Davie

FL

Greeley

CO

Daytona Beach

FL

Pueblo

CO

FL
FL

Thornton

CO

Delray Beach
Doral

Bridgeport

CT

Fort Lauderdale

FL

Bristol

CT

Fort Myers

FL

Fairfield

CT

Fort Pierce

FL

Greenwich

CT

Gainesville

FL

Hartford

CT

Greenacres

FL

Manchester

CT

Hallandale Beach

FL

Meriden

CT

Hialeah

FL

Middletown

CT

Hollywood

FL

Milford

CT

Jacksonville

FL

Naugatuck

CT

Jupiter

FL
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City
Kissimmee
Lakeland
Largo
Lauderhill
Margate
Melbourne
Miami
Miami Beach
Miami Gardens
Miramar
North Miami
North Miami Beach

State
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL

Ocala
Ocoee
Orlando
Ormond Beach
Oviedo
Palm Bay
Palm Beach Gardens
Pembroke Pines
Pensacola
Plantation
Port Orange
Port St. Lucie
St. Petersburg
Sarasota
Sunrise
Tampa
Titusville
West Palm Beach
Honolulu
Ames
Ankeny
Bettendorf
Cedar Rapids

FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
FL
HI
IA
IA
IA
1A

City

State

Council Bluffs

IA

Davenport

IA

Des Moines

IA

Dubuque

IA

Iowa City

IA

Sioux City

IA

West Des Moines

IA

Boise

ID

Pocatello

ID

Addison

IL

Algonquin

IL

Arlington Heights

IL

Aurora

IL

Bartlett

IL

Belleville

IL

Berwyn

IL

Bloomington

IL

Bolingbrook

IL

Buffalo Grove

IL

Calumet City

IL

Carol Stream

IL

Carpentersville

IL

Champaign

IL

Chicago

IL

Chicago Heights

IL

Cicero

IL

Crystal Lake

IL

Danville

IL

Decatur

IL

DeKalb

IL

Des Plaines

IL

Downers Grove

IL

Elgin

IL

Elk Grove

IL

Ehnhurst

IL
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City

State

Evanston

IL

Galesburg

IL

Glendale Heights

IL

Glenview

IL

Gurnee

IL

Hanover Park

IL

Hoffman Estates

IL

Joliet

IL

Lombard

IL

Moline

IL

Mount Prospect

IL

Mundelein

IL

Naperville

IL

Normal

IL

North Chicago

IL

Northbrook

IL

Oak Lawn

IL

Oak Park

IL

Orland Park

IL

Oswego

IL

Palatine

IL

Park Ridge

IL

Pekin

IL

Peoria

IL

Plainfield

IL

Rock Island

IL

Rockford

IL

Romeoville

IL

St. Charles

IL

Schaumburg

IL

Skokie

IL

Springfield

IL

Tinley Park

IL

Urbana

IL

Waukegan

IL
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City
Wheaton
Wheeling
Woodridge
Carmel
Evansville
Fort Wayne

State
IL
IL
IL
IN
IN
IN

Gary
Indianapolis
Lafayette
Muncie
South Bend
Terre Haute
Kansas City
Lawrence
Topeka
Wichita
Bowling Green

IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
IN
KS
KS
KS
KS
KY

Covington
Lexington
Louisville
Alexandria
Baton Rouge
Boston
Brockton
Cambridge

KY
KY
KY
LA
LA
MA
MA
MA

Chicopee
Fall River
Fitchburg
Framingham
Haverhill
Lowell
Medford
New Bedford
Newton
Plymouth

MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
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City
Revere

State
MA

Somerville
Taunton
Waltham
Watertown
Worcester
Baltimore
Bowie
Frederick
Lewiston
Portland
Ann Arbor
Battle Creek
Bay City
Dearborn
Detroit
East Lansing
Eastpointe
Farmington Hills
Flint
Grand Rapids
Jackson
Kalamazoo
Lansing
Lincoln Park
Livonia
Madison Heights
Midland
Novi
Portage
Roseville
Saginaw
Southfield
Sterling Heights
Taylor

MA
MA
MA
MA
MA
MD
MD
MD
ME
ME
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI
MI

City

State

Troy

MI

Warren

MI

West Bloomfield

MI

Westland

MI

Wyoming

MI

Blaine

MN

Bloomington

MN

Coon Rapids

MN

Duluth

MN

Mankato

MN

Minneapolis

MN

Moorhead

MN

Rochester

MN

St. Cloud

MN

St. Paul

MN

Shakopee

MN

Woodbury

MN

Blue Springs

MO

Columbia

MO

Independence

MO

Kansas City

MO

O'Fallon

MO

St. Charles

MO

St. Joseph

MO

St. Louis

MO

Springfield

MO

University City

MO

Billings

MT

Bozeman

MT

Butte

MT

Great Falls

MT

Helena

MT

Missoula

MT

Bellevue

NE

Grand Island

NE
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City

State

Lincoln

NE

Omaha

NE

Concord

NH

Dover

NH

Manchester

NH

Nashua

NH

Rochester

NH

Atlantic City

NJ

Bayonne

NJ

Brick

NJ

Camden

NJ

Clifton

NJ

East Orange

NJ

Edison

NJ

Elizabeth

NJ

Fair Lawn

NJ

Fort Lee

NJ

Garfield

NJ

Hackensack

NJ

Hamilton

NJ

Hoboken

NJ

Jersey City

NJ

Kearny

NJ

Linden

NJ

Long Branch

NJ

New Brunswick

NJ

Passaic

NJ

Paterson

NJ

Perth Amboy

NJ

Plainfield

NJ

Sayreville

NJ

Trenton

NJ

Union City

NJ

Vineland

NJ

West New York

NJ
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City
Westfield
Woodbridge
Albuquerque

State
NJ
NJ
NM

Hobbs
Las Cruces
Rio Rancho
Santa Fe
Henderson
Las Vegas
North Las Vegas
Reno
Sparks
Albany
Binghamton
Buffalo
Cheektowaga
Cicero
Freeport
Hempstead
Irondequoit
Ithaca
Jamestown
Long Beach
Mount Vernon
New Rochelle
New York
Niagara Falls
Oyster Bay
Poughkeepsie (City)
Poughkeepsie (Town)
Riverhead
Rochester
Syracuse
Tonawanda
Troy

NM
NM
NM
NM
NV
NV
NV
NV
NV
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
NY
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City

State

Utica

NY

White Plains

NY

Yonkers

NY

Akron

OH

Beavercreek

OH

Boardman

OH

Bowling Green

OH

Brunswick

OH

Canton

OH

Cincinnati

OH

Cleveland

OH

Cleveland Heights

OH

Colerain

OH

Columbus

OH

Cuyahoga Falls

OH

Dayton

OH

Delaware

OH

Dublin

OH

Elyria

OH

Euclid

OH

Fairborn

OH

Fairfield

OH

Findlay

OH

Gahanna

OH

Grove City

OH

Hamilton

OH

Hilliard

OH

Huber Heights

OH

Kent

OH

Kettering

OH

Lakewood

OH

Lancaster

OH

Lima

OH

Mansfield

OH

Marion

OH

City
Mason
Massillon
Mentor
Middletown
Newark
North Olmstead
North Ridgeville
North Royalton
Reynoldsburg
Springfield
Stow
Strongsville
Toledo
Upper Arlington
Warren
Westerville
Westlake
Youngstown
Broken Arrow
Edmond
Lawton
Midwest City
Moore
Norman
Oklahoma City
Shawnee
Stillwater
Tulsa
Albany
Beaverton
Bend
Corvallis
Eugene
Grants Pass
Gresham

State
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OH
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OK
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
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City
Hillsboro
Keizer
Lake Oswego
McMinnville
Medford
Oregon City
Portland
Salem
Springfield
Tigard
Allentown
Bethlehem
Erie
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Reading
Scranton
Cranston
East Providence
Newport
Pawtucket
Warwick
Woonsocket
Rapid City
Sioux Falls

State
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
OR
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
PA
RI
RI
RI
RI
RI
RI
SD
SD

Memphis
Nashville
Abilene
Amarillo
Austin
Baytown
Beaumont
Brownsville
Cedar Park
Corpus Christi

TN
TN
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
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City
Dallas
Del Rio
Denton
Edinburg
El Paso
Fort Worth
Galveston
Georgetown
Harlingen
Houston
Laredo
Lufkin
McAllen
McKinney
Mesquite
Pharr
Port Arthur
Round Rock
San Angelo
San Antonio
San Marcos
Temple
Waco
Salt Lake City
Burlington
Auburn
Bellevue
Bellingham
Bothell
Bremerton
Des Moines

State
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
TX
UT
VT
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA

Everett
Federal Way
Issaquah
Kennewick

WA
WA
WA
WA

2019]
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City
Kent
Lacey
Lake Stevens
Lakewood
Lynwood
Marysville
Puyallup
Redmond
Renton
Richland
Seattle
Spokane
Tacoma
Vancouver
Walla Walla
Wenatchee

State
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA
WA

City

State

Yakima

WA

Appleton

WI

Brookfield

WI

Fond du Lac

WI

Green Bay

WI

Janesville

WI

Kenosha

WI

Madison

WI

Menomonee Falls

WI

Milwaukee

WI

New Berlin

WI

Oshkosh

WI

Wausau

WI

Wauwatosa

WI

West Allis

WI
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APPENDIX

B: SURVEY INSTRUMENT

SURVEY
Poce Opinions of! Int ogation Reguifiom
IIUCTIONS: CIRC

bet

ONE ANSWER F'OR EACH FROMPT BELOW

L Sane advg4Ut,,bavc opaowd eving mjpasup tD 4 hem ednvu=1Ecd Dome
em ahiiyof
wMl tlimit
iny ymou q mDm,
n an m
intmTegutQI tD imeavu fte tu~ith ci aiheiWis burden an iuvesipim?
A-.Fin laudyburdinvestid
Ocwswatn y b e mftibgma
C. Rarely bmndm i nvesdgmu

a

D- New hufr invedguia

Some avcn have Xipomed giving mspcm

2.

mcm to

-

emdnmce i.

im
pfuti. inywi opimo%would this
of irn .tiptoa befior Hn
limt the ability of ine'rogftmrs to uncover the truth or oghmwe' lmn

dhe

-

A- Pn~nwdyburde'nvststian
B ccasiimally bwde invetiptkm
C- Rarely biade Itigat3Q

D. Mmu budm
3. Do you bei'cv mny of die' i=iaia
the Hilbood okf~ fsc anfinmin?
A-

pnripx*W above ud

nc, tsm rfinm "d&, m&n=re die m ni of file

be usfindi reducing

cmfmioum

B 1 Nodercmm,ditmrcd=&mmaberiffkL ,mxfaz

Ovdonal Feedbac In the spine provided below, ph!=s explain wiy you believe these
to uima the
jpaued repuAtin wmour vmuld na H imitte ability f um g
&a c odmrwiwe burden an investon:
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APPENDIX C: LETTER TO SURVEY PARTICIPANTS

ffAddr, Field))

Dea roFt Name oLs Name

v,

My une is Stephe Rt*= in, amd I am a profe'na at

I am wtiting you to invite you to pmip

in sot ach

Univa

CMi

School afLAw.

s-vey bou vsim pmposed

lega limitations on polife inknzogatioms of criminal sumeas
You ware ratndmy selected ma pas

petkim be== you am pat ofs aw enfiwvcana

agency in the Unied Statm
To slnre your views on this impo s

ue a put of r aakm samle, peae fi out ted

attached srvey and send it back to me at yoaw eadiest 4onvamienc (andeope and postaw is
enclose)L our esponses amanonynmu.
The survey will tale about 1-3 mlutes toomlete. 1beeve l it is crWiay ipi

leigslator to undemtand law eaoent pemives befose coizijerinew
I reatly apreit )owr tedbck
Sincerey,

Ass~n1f

ess~rofLai

Loyola Uivrs*l L7Hkiog
*
inrh ft.rbedu
Tel 312.915.7691

II-.

fit

Ice gepsizabm&

